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Abstract 
Many jurisdictions consensually consider cartel conduct as the most dangerous 
competition law infringement. To combat cartels, enforcement authorities use special 
regulations such as leniency programs to detect cartels, and establish severe 
administrative sanctions and criminal penalties up to imprisonment.  
The identification and verification of cartel conduct is no easy task for enforcers; 
that task is even more challenging in oligopolistic markets. Oligopolistic market 
conditions enable market actors to achieve price coordination without express and 
direct communication inter se; a practice that is often referred to as tacit collusion in the 
relevant literature.  There is a ongoing debate over the definition of tacit collusion. Due 
to the absence of explicit and direct communication, whether tacit collusion should be 
recognized as a type of cartel conduct is a controversial question among jurisdictions as 
well as scholars. Additionally, there exists some sort of confusing understanding in the 
competition law practitioner and regulator communities concerning the distinction 
between the notions of conscious parallelism and tacit collusion.  
This dissertation thesis strives to clarify the definition of tacit collusion so that it 
may be helpful in distinguishing certain practices from merely lawful oligopolistic 
interdependent conduct, and based on the Japanese experience, this thesis includes 
regulatory recommendations useful for the prevention of tacit collusion in oligopolistic 
markets.  
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THESIS INTRODUCTION 
 
“People of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but 
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” 
 
         Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations1 
  
I. Problem statement 
   Competition laws treat hardcore cartels as egregious violations due to their 
harmful effects on productive efficiency, consumer welfare, and their undermining of the 
fundamental principles of a free market economy. 2  A cartel is a form of business 
combination on a contractual basis, which aims to restrict competition in a market 
through fixing prices, sharing market, rigging bids and restricting production. At present, 
anti-cartel regulation has become a priority policy in the majority of the 112 competition 
jurisdictions all over the world.3 The legal consequences of cartel participation may be 
extremely severe for cartel participants, considering that these may range from 
substantial administrative fines to several years of imprisonment, depending on the 
jurisdiction.   
Firms engaging in cartel conduct are well-aware of the potential for illegality and 
of the potential consequences in case of detection by competition authorities. Therefore, 
firms have adapted to more sophisticated means to collude and to avoid leaving any 
                                                                 
1 See also in High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 662 (“[w]e have an understanding within the 
industry not to undercut each other’s prices”. “our competitors are our friends. Our customers are the 
enemy.”) 
2  Maurice Guerrin and Georgios Kyriazis.Cartels : proof and procedural issues. Fordham 
International Law Journal 16 (1992): 274. 
3  William E. Kovacic et. al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 Michigan Law 
Review (2011): 394. 
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paper trail or other evidence of cartel agreement. In more recent years, a modern form of 
price collusion may be seen to arise in connection to the use of sophisticated digital and 
algorithmic pricing tools that raise new concerns in competition law given that they may 
be considered to facilitate cartel behavior. In this regard, competition law practitioners 
face two key challenges in dealing with cartel cases:  
First, to condemn cartels, competition law requires the existence of an interfirm 
agreement or communication to establish liability. As a result, enforcement authorities 
must find and prove that price coordination resulted from the agreement or 
communication among firms; in this regard, the main problems in cartel cases occur 
particularly over the clarification of whether firms achieved agreement or 
communication. There are various means of communication, but what kind of 
communication/agreement matches the legal requirement is not always clear. The notion 
of agreement is of greater importance in oligopolistic markets where a small number of 
firms creates a mutually interdependent environment which may facilitate price 
coordination without explicit and direct communication. As a result, parallel price 
movements frequently occur in oligopolistic markets. Such a phenomenon is often 
referred to in the literature as conscious parallelism, or tacit collusion.   
Due to the absence of an explicit agreement or communication among firms, the 
majority of jurisdictions exempts conscious parallelism from the scope of cartel conduct. 
That is, were parallel price elevation to result from oligopolistic interdependency 
without the presence of explicit and direct communication, this would generally be 
lawful conduct under the competition laws of many jurisdictions.   
However, it remains the case that specific oligopolistic market conditions enable 
firms to achieve desirable price coordination without the need for direct communication. 
In particular, the use of facilitating practices replaces communication for firms thus 
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making collusion easier to occur. Facilitating practices are considered to be lawful and 
permissible conduct.  Thus, it is challenging to establish whether the behavior of firms 
satisfy the requirement of agreement or communication to infer collusion.  
The question of how to distinguish between lawful interdependent parallel pricing 
and implicit cartel conduct (tacit collusion) remains controversial in competition law. 
Competition laws fail to draw a clear distinction between the above two categories. 
What is more, there is no consensus between scholars and practitioners over when 
conscious parallelism crosses into tacit collusion. Some commentators argue that 
conscious parallelism ought to be included into the definition of cartel conduct given that 
there is a ‘meeting of mind’ between firms in such cases.4 Others disagree and believe 
that conscious parallelism should not be regarded as collusion since such parallel 
conduct is unilateral firm conduct, and may just be rational and normal oligopolistic 
behavior.5 Consequently, there is much conceptual uncertainty and doctrinal confusion 
concerning the status of tacit collusion in competition law.6 
Second, another issue regarding tacit collusion relates to the standard of proof. The 
high degree of secrecy surrounding cartels makes identification of direct evidence rarely 
attainable. Although circumstantial evidence has become admissible for a finding of 
cartel behavior, court practice often disregards indirect evidence. Due to the high 
evidentiary standards for a finding of tacit collusion, to do so based on circumstantial 
evidence presents a challenging task for enforcement authorities.7  To infer collusion, 
                                                                 
4 Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 Stanford Law 
Review 1562 (1969). 
5 Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and 
Refusals to Deal, 75 Harvard Law Review 655 (1962) [hereinafter Turner, Conscious Parallelism]. 
6 William E. Kovacic, An integrated competition policy to deter and defeat cartels. The Antitrust 
Bulletin 51, no. 4 (2006): 814. 
7 Marilena Filippelli, Collective Dominance and Collusion: Parallelism in EU and US Competition 
Law. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013:xii. 
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courts have often demanded additional evidence – the so-called plus factors. 
Nevertheless, as practice suggests, the plus factor test has failed to solve the evidentiary 
problem thus resulting in persistent dissatisfaction. 
Lastly, a further reason that the regulation of conscious parallelism is problematic 
in competition law is the absence of adequate ex-post remedy measures. The analysis 
demonstrates that ex-post regulation has been ineffective for enforcement authorities. It 
is commonly recognized that prohibiting firms from taking into account rivals’ strategies 
to behave in an oligopolistic market would be the wrong policy. Therefore, it is 
necessary to consider alternative methods, possibly ex-ante, to prevent tacit collusive 
schemes in a market.  
            II. Purpose of the study 
The primary goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the theory of tacit collusion 
in competition law. In a practical sense, it aims at the better regulation of price-fixing 
collusion in oligopolistic markets. In particular, this dissertation clarifies the definition 
of tacit collusion, and makes specific recommendations to reduce the scope for tacit 
collusion in a market. Lastly, the dissertation aims at drawing out lessons for 
Commonwealth of Independent States8 (CIS) referring to the case of Uzbekistan from 
the experiences of advanced jurisdictions to improve anti-cartel regulation in the region. 
Unlike the advanced jurisdictions, CIS countries have a shortage of recourses, 
institutional imperfections, a lack of sufficient expertise and practical experience in the 
field of combating cartels. Furthermore, CIS countries have a unique register system of 
                                                                 
8 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is the international organization, or alliance of 
countries that used to form the Soviet Union. The CIS’s functions are to coordinate its members’ 
policies regarding their economies, foreign relations, defense, immigration policies, environmental 
protection, and law enforcement.  Current members of CIS are  nine states: 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova. 
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dominant firms to control price increase in the market. In this regards, the issue how CIS 
countries should treat tacit collusions raises legal concerns, which the current 
dissertation will address.  Although the dissertation provides policy recommendations 
for CIS countries, it is also applicable for some developing countries with similar 
economic and regulatory conditions.   
 
            III. Research questions 
The central research questions are as follows: 
1) What is the definition of tacit collusion? How should we distinguish 
between lawful conscious parallelism and illegal tacit collusion?  
2) How can tacit collusion be identified? 
3) What additional measures should be considered to neutralize or limit 
tacit collusion risks associated with the use of facilitating practices? 
            IV. Methodology 
The research mostly adopts the doctrinal approach by examining the current 
literature on cartels and tacit collusion. Another primary research methodology lies in 
the analysis of enforcement practices, case study, and the experience of advanced 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, the thesis applies a comparative study methodology to 
determine the pros and cons of cartel regulation in advanced jurisdictions in order to 
identify the lessons for CIS countries including Uzbekistan.  
            V. Limitation of the study 
The scope of the thesis is limited to price- fixing cartels in oligopolistic markets. 
More specifically, the dissertation focuses on price elevation collusion. A price reduction 
and other forms of cartels are beyond the scope of this dissertation. Narrowing the scope 
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of this dissertation, the study concentrated more on price-fixing cases resulting from tacit 
collusion in upstream oligopolistic markets.  
 
           VI. Outline of the dissertation 
The dissertation is organized in four chapters.  
Chapter I introduces the general concept of cartel conduct, including fundamental 
theory and regulatory challenges of tacit collusion in oligopolistic markets.  
Chapter II observes cartel regulations in three advanced jurisdictions/competition law 
regulatory areas: namely, the US the EU, and Japan.  This chapter also explores the legal 
position concerning the issue of tacit collusion in these jurisdictions, and highlights some 
enforcement challenges.  Furthermore, Chapter II provides a comparative analysis to 
explore similar and different aspects of cartel regulation in those three jurisdictions.  
Chapter III discusses the theory and scholarly opinions on tacit collusion in 
oligopolistic markets. In particular, this chapter evaluates and summarizes scholarly 
proposals on the definition of tacit collusion and their potential to remedy the oligopoly 
problem. 
Lastly, Chapter IV provides the analysis of the former Japanese reporting system to 
draw the necessary conclusions to regulate and prevent tacit collusions in oligopolistic 
markets. Also, this chapter overviews the attributes and challenges of current cartel 
regulation in Uzbekistan, and in light of the experiences of advanced jurisdictions, this 
dissertation concludes with policy recommendations to improve the efficiency of cartel 
regulation in CIS countries on the case of Uzbekistan.  
13 
 
Chapter 1. THE CONCEPT OF COLLUSION 
     1.1. Introduction 
The international community seems to agree that anti-cartel enforcement ought to 
be a top priority for competition authorities.9 The competition laws of many countries 
treat hardcore cartels per se as illegal conduct without exception.  
Sanctions for cartel conduct are relatively stricter than for other types of violations 
of competition law, and often pertain to both corporate and individual liabilities. Along 
with severe administrative sanctions, more than 30 States have criminalized cartel 
conduct in some forms, including imprisonment, and the list is growing.10 For instance, 
under US antitrust law hardcore cartels give rise to criminal sanctions as well as treble 
damages. Although there is no criminal liability for cartel conduct under EU competition 
law per se, it imposes high administrative surcharges against cartel conduct, and some 
EU member states do impose criminal – along with civil – sanctions for breaches of 
national and EU competition rules. 11  The annual global sum of fines for cartel 
participants today routinely exceeds hundreds of millions and even billions of US dollars.  
Furthermore, to detect cartels, competition authorities have developed leniency 
programs, which are deemed to be one of the most effective means to combat cartels 
nowadays. For instance, around 60 countries now combine enhanced sanctions with a 
leniency program12 under which the first cartel participant to confess is immunized from 
                                                                 
9 Antitrust enforcement priorities and efforts towards international cooperation at the US Department 
of Justice, Remarks by Makan Delrahim Deputy Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Divis ion US 
Department of Justice Taipei, Taiwan November 15, 2004 
10 John Duns, Arlen Duke, and Brendan Sweeney, eds. Comparative Competition Law. Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2015:302. 
11 For instance, over half of EU member states now criminalize certain cartel offenses, including 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the list appears to be growing, 
12 The leniency program is a system of total exemption or a reduction in a penalty of those cartel 
participants who self-report to the competition authority any illegal cartel conduct and provide active 
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public criminal or civil prosecution, adopting a carrot and stick approach to destabilizing 
and deterring cartels. The leniency program is deemed to be the most effective and less 
costly way of obtaining direct evidence of cartel conduct. Therefore, competition 
authorities generally regard this policy as significantly contributing to the securing of 
prosecutions and deterrence. There is no doubt as to the increasing significance of 
leniency policies for the daily enforcement work of competition authorities. What is 
more, this is reflected in the growing number of firms applying for leniency reductions 
in exchange for information and co-operation.  
Nonetheless, such leniency programs proved to be less effective for detecting 
collusion in oligopolistic markets. The specific conditions of oligopolistic markets allow 
firms to coordinate their prices without any express communication or agreement, which 
makes it extremely hard for authorities to prove such price coordination cartel behavior 
on the part of firms. Furthermore, the ordinarily small number of firms in oligopolistic 
market settings is more likely to yield strong trust bonds between cartel participants thus 
making recourse to a leniency program less likely.   As a result, firms in oligopolistic 
settings may be more confident that competition authorities would be less likely to find 
any direct evidence of communication or agreement, and therefore firms may have less 
of an incentive to consider recourse to a leniency program.  
 
          1.2. Understanding of collusion                 
        In simple terms, a cartel is an agreement between firms not to compete with 
each other.13 No universally accepted definition exists for cartel conduct, and, therefore, 
the legal definition of a cartel may vary depending on the jurisdictions. Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
cooperation in the investigation. See, Development Competition Committee, ‘Fighting hard-core cartels: 
Harm, effective sanctions and leniency programs’, OECD Publishing (2002): 7-8. 
13  ICN Working Group on Cartels, ‘Building Blocks for Effective Anti-Cartel Regimes vol. 1, 
Defining Hard Core Cartel Conduct, Effective Institutions, Effective Penalties’ (June 2005): 9.  
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there are three fundamental components of a cartel that are remarkably consistent across 
all jurisdictions worldwide: (i) the presence of an anticompetitive agreement; (ii) 
between competitors; (iii) to restrict competition.14  
First, the presence of the anticompetitive agreement implies that firms act upon 
some mutual understanding, the concord of intention, and some negotiated decision.  
The means by which firms reach an 'agreement' carry little legal significance in 
competition laws.  A cartel agreement needs not be formal or written, nor is the use of 
specific words required. Furthermore, a cartel agreement needs not be a legally binding 
contract, given that it pertains to illegal behavior. Nevertheless, the means of 
establishing a cartel may be crucial evidence of the existence of an agreement in 
enforcement practice. 
The second component – namely, the need for the agreement to be ‘between 
competitors’ – refers to firms at the same level of an industry in question with direct 
rivalry relations, such as manufacturers, distributors, or retailers. It implies that a cartel 
should result from the collusion of more than one firm. Therefore, the independent or 
unilateral conduct of firms does not constitute a violation within the scope of cartels.  
The third component – namely, the term ‘a restriction of competition’ – implies a 
key aspect of cartel conduct that distinguishes anticompetitive practices from legitimate 
business agreements between competing firms. Hardcore cartels invariably result in a 
significant restriction of market competition. That is why hardcore cartels are considered 
illegal per se in all jurisdictions. 
 The definition of hardcore cartel in the OECD Recommendation (1998)15 
extends over the following four practices: price-fixing, bid riggings, output restrictions, 
                                                                 
14 Ibid., 10. 
15 OECD Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, 
1998. 
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and market allocation. Among these hardcore cartel types, price-fixing and bid-rigging 
arrangements are considered the most severe collusions given that price often is the 
principal feature against which firms compete.  
 Economic theories and empirical studies suggest that cartels lead to economic 
inefficiency and to higher costs for consumers.16 As for economic inefficiency, cartels 
create the illusion of competition while effectively operating as a monopoly. This may 
cause productive inefficiency, loss of incentives to innovate, and market misallocation of 
resources. 17  Regarding consumer welfare, as cartels usually result in a price increase 
and output reduction, consumers end up overpaying for products and services, which 
would have been cheaper were there to be competitive price-setting. Through artificial 
price elevation cartels may end up ‘stealing’ money from the customer. That is why 
creating and maintaining a cartel is one of the most egregious violations of competition 
laws.  
From the viewpoint of business, cartels have always been attractive because they 
provide an excellent opportunity to increase profits. Nonetheless, cartel formation itself 
is an uneasy process. Firms will agree to participate in the cartel when they are sure that 
being in a cartel is more profitable than competing. Even if firms have decided to 
participate in a cartel, their ability to reach a cartel arrangement relies upon the following 
factors: the number of firms in and outside the cartel, the extent of the similarity between 
participating firms that enables profit-sharing, and the challenges of reaching agreement 
on the collusive strategy they intend to implement. Crucially, cartel participants would 
have to decide matters such as cartel price, aggregate output, product standards, which 
all require comprehensive and complicated negotiations given that each firm is likely to 
                                                                 
16  ICN Working Group on Cartels, ‘Building Blocks for Effective Anti-Cartel Regimes vol. 1, 
Defining Hard Core Cartel Conduct, Effective Institutions, Effective Penalties’ (June 2005):1.  
17 Carlton, Dennis W., and Jeffrey M. Perloff. Modern Industrial Organization. Boston: Pearson-
Addison Wesley, 2005:781. 
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have different costs and market-shares, and therefore there may be disagreement as to 
the desirable cartel price depending on their circumstances.18 Therefore, the fewer the 
firms in a market the greater the capability there is to achieve collusion.  
What is more, the risk of cheating could also undermine the possibilities of success 
of reaching agreement among firms. In order to ensure the success of a cartel, firms 
ordinarily seek to establish an enforcement mechanism to, among other things, monitor 
compliance and to punish deviation.19 Monitoring compliance is the most challenging 
part necessary for maintaining the sustainability of collusion. 20 Occasionally, uncertain 
market conditions present opportunities for cartel members for higher profits by cheating 
rather than by abiding by collusive rules.  Here, monitoring compliance is an important 
means of preventing or identifying such ‘cheating’ within cartel contexts. More 
sophisticated hardcore cartels often even have formal auditing systems.  Punishing 
deviation is also essential for cartel success. To ensure that all members will 
unconditionally execute previously mutually agreed cartel rules, influential cartel leaders 
may establish individual penalties for cheaters, or threaten cheaters by increasing output 
in a market, decreasing price or by demanding compensation. The presence of an 
effective sanctioning mechanism against deviation inside a cartel may lead to the 
stability of the cartel. Nevertheless, such enforcement mechanisms may be less 
important or even unnecessary in cases of tacit collusion.  
   
          1.3. Tacit Collusion 
Cartels may take two forms: explicit or tacit. Explicit collusion is the most 
fundamental way of reaching collusive arrangements. Explicit agreements enable firms 
                                                                 
18 Ernest Gellhorn, William Kovacic, and Stephen Calkins. Antitrust law and economics in a nutshell. 
West Academic, 2004:194. 
19 George, J. Stigler, A theory of oligopoly. Journal of political Economy 72, no. 1 (1964): 44. 
20 Ibid. 
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to coordinate market activity with regard to output and prices in a more organized way. 
The primary trait of explicit agreements is that firms rely on direct inter-firm 
communication in reaching such agreements. There should be a direct exchange of 
assurances precisely indicating the presence of agreement to coordinate market behavior. 
In this regard, the mutual understanding of the parties involved has become a key feature 
of express collusion. Therefore, there is international consensus regarding the illegal 
nature of explicit cartel agreements.  
On the other hand, the legal approach to tacit collusion is a controversial matter. 
The term tacit means to ‘express or carry on without words or speech.’ That is, 
entrepreneurs can refrain from competition without reaching an explicit or direct 
agreement with each other. The fact that there is no explicit and direct 
agreement/communication creates a considerable problem for competition law and 
regulators, who tend to focus on explicit collusion.21  There is no clear definition of 
tacit collusion. Tacit collusion is occasionally referred to as conscious parallelism in 
the literature, which is incorrect equation.  
According to Keith Hylton tacit collusion typically appears in markets with small 
numbers of sellers without express agreement among firms. This occurs given that in 
markets with fewer sellers, firms take the reactions of competitors into account when 
deciding how much to produce or what price to set.22 The model of the market that 
tends to have a small number of firms is an oligopoly.23 Moreover, there is evidence 
that in oligopolies it is easier for firms to coordinate price behavior without express and 
direct communication.24 Each firm in an oligopoly realizes that it is within the interests 
of the entire small group of firms to maintain a high price or to avoid vigorous price 
                                                                 
21 Reza Dibadj, Conscious Parallelism Revisited. San Diego Law Review 47 (2010): 596. 
22 Hylton, Keith N. Antitrust law: Economic theory and common law evolution. Cambridge 
University Press, 2003:73. 
23  Joseph F. Zellmer, Detecting Collusion in Oligopolistic Industries: A Comparison and 
Proposal. Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 6 (1982): 829. 
24 Marilena Filippelli, Collective Dominance and Collusion: Parallelism in EU and US Competition 
Law. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013:76. 
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competition, and the firms act in accordance with this realization. However, the absence 
of express agreement among firms creates legal uncertainty about whether or not to 
classify such consequent conduct as a cartel. The issue of tacit collusion remains 
challenging to resolve due to the theory of oligopolistic interdependence.   
 
         1.3.1. Oligopolistic interdependence  
To achieve successful economic strategies, oligopolistic market conditions lead 
each oligopolistic firm to consider the behavior of competitors. 25 The presence of only a 
few sellers creates a kind of inter-reliant environment, where the pricing behavior of one 
firm may significantly impact competing firms. As the demand curve for the products of 
a particular oligopolist in making strategic decisions is usually unknown, firms have to 
decide based on oligopolistic assumptions what would be the reaction of competitors to 
the actions of each other. Such pricing behavior in oligopolistic markets implies the  
presence of interdependence between firms. In simple terms, this means that 
oligopolistic firms become influenced by the behavior of their rivals and that their 
behavior, in turn, influences those rivals. Each firm, then, must consider not only what 
its opponents happen to be doing at the moment but also the way in which rivals may 
respond to its actions. 26  Due to such interdependence, prices in oligopolistic markets 
usually do not change as often as under perfect competition conditions.27 
                                                                 
25 Carlton, Dennis W., and Jeffrey M. Perloff. Modern Industrial Organization. Boston: Pearson-
Addison Wesley, 2005:157.   
26  It should be noted here that despite the fact that oligopolistic market structure creates good 
conditions for coordination of firms’ behavior, it should not be implied that oligopolies always lead 
to inefficiencies. See, Hawk, Barry E., and Giorgio A. Motta. "Oligopolies and Collective 
Dominance: A Solution in Search of a Problem." In Treviso Conference on Antitrust Between EC 
Law and National Law,. 2008:60-62. 
27 Massimo Motta Competition policy: theory and practice. Cambridge University Press, 2004:142-
149; Richard Whish and David Bailey. Competition Law 5th. London: LexisNexis (2003): 505-509.   
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The theory of oligopolistic interdependence shows that firms have little incentive 
to compete.28 Due to the small number of firms, price reduction by one firm may attract 
customers from another firm.  Rival firms also have to reduce the price consequentially 
to avoid loss of customers. It is a destructive situation for all firms because such 
competition would result in profit minimization. Likewise, unilateral price elevation by 
an oligopolistic firm would be ruinous for a firm as many customers may leave it for the 
lower prices of another firm. Therefore, according to the theory of oligopolistic 
interdependence, firms tend to be dependent on each other, which makes them take into 
consideration the marketing strategies of other oligopolists. 29  Consequently, firms in 
oligopolistic markets are highly interested in minimizing price competition and securing 
non-competitive stability.30  
Game theory 31  adeptly explains this phenomenon by demonstrating how 
oligopolists can maintain supra-competitive prices without entering into explicit price-
fixing agreements.32 Simply put, according to game theory, repeated interactions enable 
oligopolists to predict the possible reactions of competitors33 and will gravitate towards 
tacit collusion. 34  Game theory claims that firms in an oligopolistic market are 
incentivized to coordinate their actions because it results in profit maximization. 
                                                                 
28  William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 Michigan Law 
Review 393 (2011).  
29 29 Carlton, Dennis W., and Jeffrey M. Perloff. Modern Industrial Organization. Boston: Pearson-
Addison Wesley, 2005:157. 
30 Richard Whish and David Bailey. Competition Law 5th. London: LexisNexis (2003): 546. 
31  Game theory examines via mathematical methods the behavior of participants associated with 
decision-making process in probabilistic situations. In economics, game theory analyzes oligopolistic 
behavior focusing on strategic interactions, moves and countermoves among competing firms.  
32 Thomas A. Piraino Jr, Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws.  Minn. L. Rev. 89 
(2004): 18. 
33 John E. Lopatka, Solving the oligopoly problem: Turner's try. Antitrust Bulletin 41 (1996): 890. 
34 Thomas A Piraino Jr, Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws. Minnesota Law 
Review 89 (2004): 30 
21 
 
Due to oligopolistic interdependence, any change in policy by one firm resulting in 
increased sales for it will cause a significant decline in market share of its competitors. 
Therefore, each firm must take into account the actions of its rivals in the price-setting 
process and do so in a manner compatible with the interests of its competitors to avoid 
any hostile reaction on their part. It follows that the market conduct of competitors will 
often be similar or parallel. 35 The pricing behavior of oligopolists increases the outward 
appearance of parallel conduct. As a result, in oligopolistic markets price elevation by 
one firm will usually be followed by a parallel price increase of another firm, and 
therefore prices in a market will be higher than expected under normal competitive 
conditions.36  Usually, such supra-competitive prices can be achieved through explicit 
cartel coordination, but due to the specific conditions of oligopolistic markets, it is 
possible for this to arise through conscious parallelism.37  
Thus, oligopolistic interdependence often causes a pattern of parallel pricing.38 The 
economic consequences of such parallelism are the same as those of a price-fixing 
cartel.39  Therefore, from the consumer’s perspective, conscious parallelism is just as bad 
as cartel price-fixing40 even if it lacks the element of agreement per se.  
  Contemporary economists also uniformly consider conscious parallelism just as 
harmful to the consumer as explicit price-fixing cartels 41  and advise that such 
oligopolistic parallelism such as tacit collusion ought to be treated in the same way as 
cartel conduct. 42 However, another theory explains that conscious parallelism might be a 
rational behavior of firms as a result of competition, especially in a market with a small 
                                                                 
35 Reza Dibadj, Conscious Parallelism Revisited. San Diego Law Review 47 (2010): 590. 
36 Massimo Motta Competition policy: theory and practice. Cambridge University Press, 2004: 138 
37 Ibid. 
38 Michael D Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitating Devices: The Problem of 
Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws. New York Law School Law Review 24 (1978): 882. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 68. 
41 Thomas A. Piraino Jr, Regulating Oligopoly Conduct under the Antitrust Laws. Minnesota Law 
Review 89 (2004): 22. 
42 W. T. Stanbury and G. B. Reschenthaler. Oligopoly and conscious parallelism: Theory, policy and 
the Canadian cases, Osgoode Hall Law Journal 15 (1977): 617, 688. 
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number of firms and homogenous products.43  The controversy over the nature of tacit 
collusion and the way to separate lawful interdependent conduct from collusive is 
neither recent nor has it been resolved satisfactorily. A key factor in distinguishing 
between tacit collusion and oligopolistic inter-dependence is the presence of facilitating 
practices. 
 
         1.3.2. Facilitating practices vs. tacit collusion 
As practice suggests, tacit collusion is difficult to occur without the assistance of 
facilitating practices, the use of which is, on its face, lawful under the competition laws. 
Oligopolistic firms understand that cartel formation is risky as it might attract the 
attention of regulators, which may result in detection and further penalization. On the 
other hand, facilitating practices enable firms to circumvent the law by ‘legal’ means.  
Facilitating practices are typical for oligopolistic markets, where with the use of 
such practices firms can reduce market uncertainty and coordinate their price behavior.44 
For instance, it may include preannouncements of price changes, price reporting systems, 
meeting competition clauses, most- favored-customer clauses, delivered or basing-point 
pricing, and industry-wide resale price maintenance. Such facilitating practices make 
business transaction pricing more transparent and thus make it easier for firms to 
understand each other’s price intentions without direct communication. In other words, 
facilitating practices refer to the actions of oligopolistic firms that assist in eradicating 
behavioral uncertainty among competitors and in reaching coordinative strategy more 
effectively which itself is not characterized as a cartel agreement. 45  
Nevertheless, facilitating practices may have procompetitive as well as 
anticompetitive effects depending on the circumstances in which they take place. For 
instance, an advance public price announcement, which on the one hand, may lower 
market uncertainty between oligopolistic firms, may, on the other, benefit customers by 
                                                                 
43 Glossary OECD. 
44 OECD, Facilitating practice in Oligopolies, 2007. 
45 OECD, Facilitating practices in Oligopolies, 2007:9. 
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providing them with necessary information. Public price announcements may take many 
forms of communication such as press releases or other media communications to 
inform the market about strategies, products, and developments concerning a firm.  
Basically, public price announcements are recognized as unilateral disclosures, 
one-way communications, but not as ‘exchanges of information.’  However, a public 
announcement might also amount to an ‘exchange of information,’ if it is used as an 
invitation to collude or to indirectly signal intentions.  Signaling can take place on the 
basis of an agreement or in the context of independent behavior. Companies can signal 
their willingness to collude by unilaterally increasing their prices. Other companies can 
then react by raising their prices as well, with the first price increase acting as a common 
orientation point. Such a strategy carries the risk that competitors will refrain from 
raising their own prices. In such a case, the firm incurs costs in the form of lost sales due 
to the unilateral price increase. 
The case of private announcements is much more clear as they are directed to 
competitors only and therefore can always be recognized as invitations to collude. 
Conversely, public announcements, which are directed to both rival firms and consumers, 
may provide significant benefits to customers and therefore the issue of whether they are 
used as an invitation to collude would depend on how the communication is formulated.  
As such, public price announcements present a unique enforcement question as 
they are considered to pertain to unilateral disclosures, but not to an agreement 
themselves.  Further issues arise, however, where the firms each adopt the same 
facilitating practice without any express agreement: does parallel pricing together with 
the parallel adoption of facilitating practices allow a court to infer the presence of 
agreement? That is, the dilemma for the enforcement authority is that the parallel 
behavior which is witnessed when all the firms in an industry announce identical price 
changes within a short period of time may be a reflection of a formal conspiracy, or it 
may simply reflect a series of independent decisions in the market. For example, costs of 
materials may have risen for all firms in an industry, so all firms are aware that costs 
have risen and a price increase is necessary to maintain profitability. Therefore, when 
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one firm announces a price increase, and then all others follow it by raising their prices, 
no conspiracy in the legal sense has occurred. Each firm has made its own decisions, but 
it has done so in response to a common motivating factor. On the other hand, the process 
may only be a façade – a means by which to maintain supra-competitive prices using the 
announcement of increased costs as a coordinating device. Typically, there is no 
certainty as to the correct interpretation and as to how the policymaker should address 
this issue.46 That is understandable as bright-line is difficult to establish.  
Nevertheless, an analysis of certain factors such as the nature, content, method, 
and context of such disclosures may play a significant role in the identification of 
practices used for anticompetitive collusive purposes.  Such evaluation of facilitating 
practices of such cases may only be fact-specific.  
 
         1.3.3. Algorithms and tacit collusion 
Nowadays, in the digital economy, the analysis of large amounts of data (big data) 
are becoming increasingly important. Modern Information Technology (IT) technologies 
enable firms to use more innovative tools such as algorithms for pricing. The issue of 
price algorithms and its potential risk of infringement of competition law have attracted 
the attention of the international competition community in recent years. The topic is not 
well researched so far, and almost no cases exist on algorithmic collusions.  One of the 
characteristics of price algorithms is that it is frequently deployed by firms operating in 
downstream markets rather than upstream.  
From the perspective of firms, algorithms are useful to optimize prices and 
quantities, among other things. However, there are also concerns that the use of pricing 
algorithms can increase the risk of undesirable parallel pricing (tacit collusion), or, at the 
                                                                 
46 W. T. Stanbury and G. B. Reschenthaler, Oligopoly and Conscious Parallelism: Theory, Policy and 
the Canadian Cases. Osgoode Hall Law Journal 15.3 (1977): 627. 
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very least, algorithms could also be used to automate the signaling of an intention to 
collude.47 
As mentioned earlier, one method with which firms can solve the coordination 
problem without communicating directly with each other is through signaling. Usually, a 
firm uses public price announcement practices for signaling, but price algorithms can 
replace this. The signaling of a willingness to collude can be carried out by 
corresponding programmed algorithms. 48  Other firms that also use algorithms can 
observe these signals and adjust their prices accordingly. Since algorithms allow this 
process to run much faster than before, the costs of signaling in the form of lost sales can 
be significantly reduced. Thus, the use of algorithms could lead more often to the 
signaling of a willingness to collude and thus ultimately to collusion itself. 49 Therefore, 
in this author’s opinion, the use of price algorithms may be recognized as a type of 
facilitating practice to be considered within the general theory of facilitating practice as 
discussed in this dissertation.  
          1.4. Proof requirement  
Facilitating practices are useful to determine whether the conduct in oligopolies 
may set the conditions for tacit collusion or whether it amounts to simple oligopolistic 
interdependence. 50 However, courts may not easily infer an agreement from the parallel 
adoption of facilitating practices given that such practices are considered to be unilateral 
conduct and that they may have a pro-competitive effect. Collusion requires proof of the 
existence of an anti-competitive agreement among firms. In other words, competition 
                                                                 
47 Excerpt from Chapter I of the XXII. Biennial Report of the Monopolies Commission (‘Competition 
2018’) in accordance with Section 44 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the German Act against Restraints of 
Competition Available at:  
http://www.monopolkommission.de/images/HG22/Main_Report_XXII_Algorithms_and_Collus ion.p
df 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Jaime Eduardo Castro Maya, “The limitations on the punishability of tacit collusion in EU 
competition law”, Rev. Derecho Competencia. Bogotá (Colombia), vol. 13 N° 13, (2017): 236-37.  
Available online at https://centrocedec.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/7-castro-195-2401.pdf 
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authorities must present evidence that goes beyond the possibility of independent or 
unilateral conduct.  
Competition authorities utilize two distinct categories of evidence to prove the 
existence of collusion: namely, direct evidence 51  and circumstantial evidence. 
Unsurprisingly, competition authorities prefer direct evidence, but in most cases, such 
evidence is rarely available52 as tacit collusion may occur without meetings, telephone 
calls, or any other direct contact or communication. 53   Furthermore, anti-cartel 
enforcement practice indicates that firms have learned to camouflage their collusive 
action scrupulously, therefore direct evidence often is unavailable.54 Cartel participants 
are very skillful to conceal traces that may prove anti-competitive conduct. What is more, 
they often have no interest in cooperating with enforcers on an investigation unless they 
benefit from some leniency program. Therefore, even a good arsenal of investigative 
tools at the disposal of regulators may not be sufficient for the collection of direct 
evidence.  In this context, reliance upon circumstantial (indirect) evidence to 
demonstrate the existence of collusion can be significant.55  
 
                                                                 
51  Direct evidence is such evidence that directly proves or disproves an alleged or disputed fact 
without resorting to any assumption or inference. Examples of direct evidence may include a copy of 
the actual agreement, a statement by a person who attended a cartel meeting, an internal company 
memorandum written to report the cartel meeting, notes of a telephone conversation, and/or a 
statement or testimony by a person who was approached by the cartel to join the agreement.  
52 Michael K. Vaska, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining the Boundary.  The University 
of Chicago Law Review 52, no. 2 (1985): 508. 
53 Thomas A. Piraino Jr, Regulating Oligopoly Conduct under the Antitrust Laws. Minnesota Law 
Review 89 (2004): 30. 
54  Maurice Guerrin and Georgios Kyriazis. Cartels: proof and procedural issues. Fordham 
International Law Journal 16 (1992): 300. 
55  William E. Kovacic, The identification and proof of horizontal agreements  under the antitrust 
laws, Antitrust Bulletin 38 (1993): 28. 
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         1.4.1. Circumstantial evidence 
Circumstantial evidence is such information that may it reasonable to infer 
collusion.56   In general, a blend of evidence involving communication between firms 
and economic evidence of collusion is often referred to as circumstantial evidence by the 
courts.57  
The use of circumstantial evidence is similar to the process of a jigsaw puzzle.  
The whole picture of collusion may emerge after each piece of circumstantial evidence is 
considered together rather than separately. Therefore, a holistic approach towards the use 
of circumstantial evidence is much preferable because only by putting together all 
circumstantial evidence may an inference of collusion be proper. 58   
Circumstantial evidence may sensibly be divided into two types. Communication 
evidence – i.e., evidence that indicates the existence of communication between cartel 
participants but does not define the content of their communications – 59 and economic 
evidence which mainly describes firm behavior, market characteristics etc.60  
Economic evidence may further be considered to entail two categories of evidence: 
conduct and structural evidence. Conduct evidence includes, most importantly, evidence 
of parallel conduct, simultaneous price increases or identical bidding patterns in public 
tenders.61 Structural economic evidence includes evidence of such factors as high market 
concentration and homogeneous products. Between these two types of economic 
                                                                 
56  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Prosecuting Cartels without Direct 
Evidence, 2006 (para 2.1). 
57 See, e.g., Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003); Blomkest 
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000); In re Baby Food 
Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999); Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling- Delaware 
Co., 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 
478 (1st Cir. 1988).  
58 Ibid., 18. 
59 Ibid., 20. 
60 Ibid., 20-21. 
61  William S. Comanor and Mark A. Schankerman, Identical bids and cartel behavior,  The Bell 
Journal of Economics (1976): 281. 
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evidence, conduct evidence is considered the more important.  There is criticism that 
economic analysis alone cannot demonstrate the exact significance of a commercial or 
industrial behavior in a specific market. 62  Careful economic analysis often points to 
justified behavior for some sort of collective market behavior such as price leadership or 
oligopolistic interdependence thereby conviction of firms for cartel behavior less likely 
or unjustified.63 Nevertheless, economic evidence is viewed as ambiguous evidence as 
some courts have found it challenging to understand fundamental economic theories, and 
have expressly conceded that economics may be too complicated to be understood by 
courts.64 Hence, there is divergence in court practice in dealing with economic analyses, 
and courts often reject the use of economic evidence to infer collusion.65   
 
Communication evidence refers to whether firms met or otherwise communicated, 
but that does not describe the substance of their communications.66 It includes records of 
telephone calls between competitors, but not their content, travel to a common 
destination, participation in a meeting, minutes of meetings that mention price or 
capacity but no agreement, internal documents that show knowledge of a competitor’s 
pricing strategy and/or awareness of a future price increase by a rival.  Communication 
evidence is generally considered to be the most probative of an agreement. 67 Analysis of 
cartel cases with significant employment of circumstantial evidence in advanced 
                                                                 
62  Maurice Guerrin and Georgios Kyriazis, Cartels: proof and procedural issues, Fordham 
International Law Journal 16 (1992): 312. 
63 Ibid., 312. 
64 OECD, Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement, Executive Summary of the 
Roundtable on Techniques for Presenting Complex Economic Theories to Judges, 19 February 2008: 
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65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 10. 
67  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Prosecuting Cartels without Direct 
Evidence, 2006:10. 
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jurisdictions suggests that evidence of interfirm communication was an essential 
component in almost all successful cases.68   
Facilitating practices, including public statements, advance price announcements, 
predictions about industry demand or costs, and open discussions of various matters at 
trade associations meetings, can be highly probative of interfirm communication because 
they contribute to our understanding of how and what firms have done, and why.69 Thus, 
facilitating practices may serve as essential communication evidence supporting an 
inference of collusion in a market.  
The fundamental problem with circumstantial evidence is that there are no clear 
standards concerning the minimum quantum and forms of circumstantial evidence that 
will suffice to permit an inference of collusion.70 As a result, courts often approach cartel 
allegations based on circumstantial evidence with skepticism. Courts have struggled to 
develop suitable evidentiary standards to distinguish tacit collusion from lawful 
oligopolistic interdependence, which is visible in plus factors analysis suggested by 
courts.  
 
         1.4.2. Plus factors 
Taking into account the justification of oligopolistic interdependence, courts tend 
to be reluctant to consider conscious parallelism itself as sufficient evidence to establish 
collusion. Along with the fact of parallel pricing, courts often demand additional 
evidence, which may exclude the possibility that parallel pricing resulted from 
oligopolistic interdependency. 71  Such additional evidence is often referred to as plus 
factor in the literature.    
                                                                 
68 OECD, Prosecuting cartels without direct evidence of agreement, June 2007: 5 
69 Louis Kaplow, Direct versus communications-based prohibitions on price fixing, Journal of Legal 
Analysis 3, no. 2 (2011): 466. 
70  William E. Kovacic, The identification and proof of horizontal agreements under the antitrust 
laws, Antitrust Bulletin. 38 (1993):18, 20. 
71 Michael K. Vaska, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining the Boundary,  The University 
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Plus factors are defined as economic actions and outcomes, above and beyond 
parallel conduct by oligopolistic firms that are mostly inconsistent with unilateral 
conduct but largely consistent with explicitly coordinated action. 72  Arguably, plus 
factors help to distinguish between collusive and non-collusive pricing.  
Courts have highlighted the following five plus- factors as helpful to identify 
collusion in a market: 
 
a)  Action against self-interest 
It is the most cited plus-factor. It means that the action would be contrary to self-
interest if undertaken independently, but would be in the interest of firms if undertaken 
jointly. 73  Evidence satisfying this requirement includes artificial standardization of 
products and raising prices in a time of oversupply.74 Therefore, courts regard conduct 
contrary to independent self- interest as probative of conspiracy. 75   Nonetheless, the 
notion of contrary to self-interest is itself ambiguous. For instance, when a firm 
participates in a cartel, it may be acting against its short-term self- interest, since it could 
profit immediately by breaking with the group and increasing sales. On the other hand, 
in terms of long-term self- interest, the maintaining the higher price is in the interest of 
each firm. Thus, it is in the self- interest of firms to behave in a parallel manner even if 
this means sacrificing short-term profits in the hope of long-term supra-competitive 
pricing.76 Moreover, some scholars argue that it is relatively easy to say that this plus 
                                                                 
72 Ibid., at 393. 
73 Milgram v. Loew’s Inc., 192 F2d 579, 583 (3d Cir.1951).  
74  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Prosecuting Cartels without Direct 
Evidence, 2006:176. 
75 Sigrid Stroux, US and EC oligopoly control. Kluwer Law International, 2004: 50. 
76 Page, William H. "Facilitating practices and concerted action under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act." Antitrust Law and Economics 4 (2010):28. 
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factor is not present.77 Consider, for example, a case in which each oligopolist is willing 
to maintain a higher price level only if its competitors all charge the same prices. Such 
behavior can be interdependent, but it also does not constitute an ‘agreement.’ The 
problem then is that a contrary to a firm’s self-interest plus factor is not much of a 
reliable standard to infer collusion. Another criticism is that the concept of action 
against self-interest can merely constitute a restatement of interdependence.78  
 
b) Motive to conspire 
Several courts consider that motivation for collective action supports an inference 
of conspiracy from parallel behavior. A motive for conspiracy implies that the plaintiff 
must show that individual firms were in a position to benefit from specified concerted 
conduct. That is, there should be some indication that firms would have a disincentive to 
engage in the conduct unless others did the same.79  However, some scholars argue that 
this plus factor has the same defect as the plus factor acting against self-interest and 
therefore that the element of motive to collude may be of little significance. 80 
Furthermore, this plus factor has been criticized as unhelpful given that the intention of 
coordination is immaterial and impossible to prove.81 
 
c) Factual plus factors 
This plus factor mainly indicates the evidence of an opportunity for collusion. For 
instance, this plus factor includes evidence of interfirm communications, especially 
                                                                 
77 Michael D. Blechman, "Conscious Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitating Devices: The Problem 
of Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws." New York Law School Law Review 24 (1978):897. 
78 Ibid. See also Coleman v. Cannon Oil Company Citation (1993). 
79 Louis Kaplow, Competition policy and price fixing. Princeton University Press, 2013:112. 
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when quickly followed by simultaneous identical actions. 82 This plus factor also includes 
identical sealed bids with the similarity of language, terms, and conditions where such 
uniformity could not occur without collusion.83 Several courts have held that meetings or 
other communications among conspirators, which show no more than a mere 
opportunity to conspire are insufficient to support an inference of conspiracy, at least 
where the defendants offer plausible and legitimate business justifications for the 
communications.84      
 
d) Economic plus factors 
Economic evidence can also be adduced by plaintiffs and acknowledged by courts 
to support conspiracy claims based on parallel behavior. Illustrative are a defendant’s 
restriction of output, stable market shares, prices that fail to fluctuate with demand, high 
profit margins, data, and/or long-term patterns of price identity.85 It should be noted that 
courts have differing approaches to the plus factor of parallel conduct together with high 
profit margins. Some courts were convinced to establish collusion, 86  while others 
decided that it was insufficient to infer a conspiracy.87 
 
e)  Facilitating practice as plus factors 
                                                                 
82  Vaska, Michael K. "Conscious parallelism and price fixing: Defining the boundary." The 
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83 Sigrid Stroux, US and EC oligopoly control, Kluwer Law International, 2004:51 
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 Facilitating practices – including exchange of information and advance price 
announcements – can be considered as sufficient plus factors to infer cartel agreement if 
there is no business justification for such conduct. However, as mentioned previously, 
facilitating practices are not always anticompetitive. 88 It might concern a merely rational 
adaptation in an oligopolistic market. The question of whether specific facilitating 
practices have anticompetitive effects is challenging and, there are no clearly defined 
standards to make this distinction.  
Antitrust tribunals generally adhere to the principle that the proffered evidence, 
including plus factors, should be weighed as a whole. Courts should not view each piece 
of evidence in a vacuum89 or in isolation but instead each piece of evidence should serve 
as a tile in the mosaic of an overall plan or conspiracy.90 
Professor Kovacic indicates the defect of the plus factor test is that the courts 
generally have not articulated a specific hierarchy of plus factors regarding their 
probative strength for inferring collusion.91 There is no apparent justification in judicial 
decisions as to why specific plus factors have more evidentiary value than others.  92  In 
other words, there is no readily accepted principle, which determines what counts as a 
sufficient plus factor and what does not, or what combinations of plus factors might be 
sufficient.93 Thus, courts appear to lack a clear methodology regarding the application of 
plus factors. Nonetheless, Professor Kaplow argues that many plus factors are merely 
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Review 393 (2011):406. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Louis Kaplow, Competition policy and price fixing. Princeton University Press, 2013:111 
34 
 
alternative ways of describing oligopolistic interdependence. 94  He argues that plus 
factors establish that behavior is interdependent rather than purely independent. 
Consequently, current plus factor analysis described by courts seems to require enforcers 
to demonstrate the presence of interdependence between firms. But, when courts then 
find that such interdependence is insufficient, it is unclear what further alternative plus 
factors courts implicitly seem to demand.95  
 
          1.5. Concluding remarks 
  Hardcore cartel agreements are deemed to embody the most egregious 
infringement of competition law. The harmful effect of hardcore cartels conduct on 
economic efficiency and consumer welfare is well recognized, and therefore competition 
law treats cartels sternly by prohibiting them per se and by imposing severe sanctions. 
Due to the secret nature of cartels, their identification and ability to prove their presence 
is a challenging task for competition authorities given that they must identify the 
existence of an agreement between two and more entrepreneurs in order to prosecute 
cartel conduct.  There should be a bargain between entrepreneurs, and that conduct 
should not be the outcome of collective action, not unilateral.  
In particular, the identification of collusive agreement has become more 
problematic in oligopolistic markets, where entrepreneurs may use the ir mutual 
interdependence to coordinate market behavior. The theory of oligopoly shows that the 
oligopolistic market structure facilitates collusion among firms as to reach 
anticompetitive agreement in an oligopolistic market with a small number of firms is 
much easier than in other markets. Also, game theory proves that oligopolists are 
incentivized to maximize their profits via cartel arrangements. Furthermore, an 
                                                                 
94 Kaplow, Louis. "On the meaning of horizontal agreements in competition law." California Law 
Review (2011): 57. 
95 Ibid., 59. 
35 
 
oligopolistic environment presents opportunities for entrepreneurs to collude without 
express communication. Notably, this is visible in the example of parallel price 
movement, where oligopolists may consciously adapt their business practices based on 
what other firms are doing.  
There is universal consensus that explicit collusion is illegal to conduct and is thus 
an infringement of competition law.  Conversely, conduct resulting strictly from 
oligopolistic interdependence is most often not seen as an infringement of competition 
law. It is additionally undisputed that between explicit and tacit collusion there are 
circumstances in which firms engage in a range of practices that may assist them to 
lower strategic uncertainty and coordinate their price behavior in a more organized 
manner. These include all practices such as the exchange of information with rival firms 
as well as unilateral communications such as public price announcements, which 
ultimately may help to artificially increase market transparency. Nonetheless, whether 
unilateral disclosures of information resulting in price coordination – as opposed to 
reciprocal exchanges of information – should be condemned remains uncertain in 
competition law. This raises an enforcement dilemma on how to deal with such practices 
that do not amount to explicit collusion per se but that encourage tacit collusion.  
Taking into account the fact that tacit collusion is usually driven by facilitating 
practices, a careful examination of these specific practices, their anticompetitive effects, 
and efficiencies, as well as their objectives or purposes can suffice for the inference of 
collusion. Firms may use the practice of public announcements as a signal to align their 
price strategies or as an invitation to collude. Drawing a distinction between purely 
unilateral conduct and signaling, which falls under coordinated conduct, is also a difficult 
task for competition enforcers.96 Courts consider parallel behavior as insufficient to infer 
collusion per se and invariably require additional evidence – namely, the presence of plus 
                                                                 
96 Collusion and Unilateral Price Announcements Antonio Capobianco Senior Expert on Competition 
Law, OECD Competition Division. 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/Cartel3-28-2013-1.pdf 
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factors. Nevertheless, the plus factor test has in practice proved to be less effective in 
distinguishing between mere oligopolistic interdependent conduct and a cartel.  
In sum, Chapter I has introduced a general concept of collusion, and has 
highlighted relevant issues surrounding it. The next part of the dissertation seeks to 
provide an overview of the legal approaches on tacit collusion in three specific 
jurisdictions/regulatory areas: namely, the United States, European Union, and Japan.   
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Chapter 2. REGULATION OF TACIT COLLUSION IN ADVANCED 
JURISDICTIONS 
Cartel regulation is a priority task for competition enforcers in the US, the EU, and 
Japan. All three jurisdictions treat cartels strictly.  There are fewer differences at play in 
their legal approach towards tacit collusion, and therefore they also face similar 
challenges. This chapter explores the similarities, differences, and challenges in the 
regulation of tacit collusion in these three jurisdictions.  
 
          2.1. The United States  
The US competition law regime is one of the oldest and most influential regimes in 
the world. 97  The US Sherman Act is one of the earliest competition laws that were 
adopted (namely, in 1890). 98  Therefore, the US competition law regime has a rich 
history and experience in the field of competition law.  Anti-competitive agreements and 
collusions are prohibited by Section I of the Sherman Act, where hardcore cartels are 
treated as illegal in the US.99  
The US position on the importance of an effective anti-cartel enforcement program 
has long been apparent. The US has long been the global leader in aggressively pursuing 
competition policy. The detection and prosecution of hardcore cartels have always been 
and remain a primary law enforcement priority. Furthermore, the sanctioning regime is 
                                                                 
97 Maher M. Dabbah, International and comparative competition law,  Cambridge University Press, 
2010:227. 
98 NB., competition law roots may be traced in Canada to the Act for the Prevention and Suppression 
of Combinations in Restraint of Trade enacted in 1889. 
99 Maher M. Dabbah,. International and comparative competition law, Cambridge University Press, 
2010:241. 
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quite severe in the US. Along with substantial fines and treble damages in civil litigation, 
criminal penalties such as imprisonment are also possible with the US system.100  
 
       2.1.1. Regulation of tacit collusion under Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
The term cartel is not defined in US law, regulations, or guidelines. Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act provides that: 
  
‘[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.’  
It is rare for courts to assign separate meanings to above three categories of offense 
in the definition of cartel conduct, and so the statute is usually paraphrased as prohibiting 
any agreement that is restrictive of trade. 101  That is, Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
requires a ‘contract, combination or conspiracy,’ which is often referred to simply as an 
‘agreement.’ 
  US courts have continuously struggled to define the operative terms of ‘contract, 
combination or conspiracy.’  As shall be observed below, for more than a century since 
the Sherman Act came into force, courts have come up with various interpretations of 
‘agreement’ to determine whether or not the challenged conduct is the outcome of a 
cartel arrangement.  
The interpretation of ‘agreement’ in cases of oligopolistic interdependence is more 
uncertain in US competition law.  Whether the concept of ‘agreement’ can be extended 
to tacit collusion is a controversial issue in the US. When the case involves a parallel 
                                                                 
100 The Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 signif icantly increased the 
maximum penalties for antitrust offenses. The Act has increased the maximum corporate fine from 
US$10 million to US$100 million, an individual f ine up to US$1 million and raised the maximum jail 
sentence from three to ten years. 
101  John Duns, Arlen Duke, and Brendan Sweeney, eds. Comparative Competition Law. Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2015:59. 
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price elevation in an oligopolistic market, recent US courts consider the next three 
possible explanations for such synchronic conduct: a) the conduct is independent, 
therefore there is neither harm nor violation; b)  the conduct is interdependent, has 
resulted from oligopolistic interdependence, and therefore there is harm but apparently 
no violation; c) the conduct is more than just interdependent, therefore the circumstantial 
evidence must be capable of proving collusion. 102  Thus, oligopolistic interdependent 
parallel behavior does not constitute collusion even when there is clear harm. 
A review of the relevant case law suggests that historically the legal attitude 
towards tacit collusion in US courts has not been certain and can be separated into two 
periods: 1) when conscious parallelism was equated to tacit collusion and thus to a 
cartel; and 2) when mere conscious parallelism, without the presence of additional 
supporting evidence, fails to constitute a cartel.    
 
a) Conscious parallelism is equal to tacit collusion (1939-1954) 
In the Interstate Circuit v. the United States (1939)103  one witnesses an initial 
judicial attempt to define the main elements of cartel agreement. The case concerned 
eight distributors of movie exhibitors that had fixed the minimum prices charged for 
first-run films. In this case, the manager of Interstate Circuit had sent identically 
written proposal- letters to each of the eight distributors demanding they refuse to 
supply exhibitors that either refuse the schedule of minimum prices with first-run films. 
Then, each distributor responded to the proposal with an identical counter-offer. Taking 
these facts into account, the US Supreme Court stated that an explicit agreement is not 
                                                                 
102  John Duns, Arlen Duke, and Brendan Sweeney, eds. Comparative Competition Law. Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2015:69. 
103 306 U.S.208 (1939). 
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needed as it may be inferred by the ‘adherence to a plan’ and the ‘acceptance of the 
proposed behavior’.  
In American Tobacco Co. v. United States (1946) 104  three leading cigarette 
companies had maintained the same price list and discounts, and had raised prices even 
during the peak of the Great Depression when the demand for cigarettes had fallen. The 
Supreme Court concluded that ‘no formal agreement is necessary to constitute an 
unlawful conspiracy,’ but a unity of purpose or a universal design and understanding, or 
a meeting of minds and the absence of economic justification would be sufficient to infer 
collusion.105 
  The decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Paramount Pictures 
(1948)106 almost repeated the American Tobacco ruling and further expanded the scope 
of cartel conduct. In this case, five companies specified the same minimum prices in 
licenses, used the same clearances, applied the same practices and imposed identical 
terms concerning a variety of complex matters. Taking into consideration these findings, 
the Court stated that no express agreement is necessary to find a conspiracy, but it is 
sufficient that a concert of action is present. 107  Thus, courts broadly interpreted the 
definition of cartel conduct, so as to equate conscious parallelism to collusion.108  
 
b) Mere conscious parallelism is insufficient for collusion (since 1954) 
The Theatre Enterprise v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., (1954) 109  ruling 
was a turning point in legal efforts to determine what constitutes cartel conduct, which 
                                                                 
104 328 U.S. 781 (1946). 
105 Ibid., 810. 
106 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
107 Ibid., 142. 
108 Michael D. Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signaling and Facilitating Devices: The Problem of 
Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws, New York Law School  Law Review 24 (1978): 882-885 
109 346 U.S. 537 (1954). 
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largely narrowed the definition of collusion propounded in previous cases. In this case, 
movie distributors restricted in parallel ‘first-run’ dates for local theaters. The Supreme 
Court has ruled that the restrictions were reasonable steps for each firm, regardless of 
whether rivals followed suit 110  and therefore the mere parallel behavior of firms is 
insufficient to infer collusion. The Court stated that ‘conscious parallelism has not yet 
read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.’111 This ruling caused a heated debate 
between the Harvard and Chicago law schools. Harvard scholar Turner112 supported the 
Court’s decision, while Chicago scholar Posner disagreed with the limitation of the 
scope of Section 1 that complicates its application to tacit collusion.113 Thus, the Theatre 
Enterprise case made clear that it is not sufficient to establish mere ‘conscious 
parallelism’ or ‘oligopolistic interdependence’ for an agreement to be inferred.  
Then, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.  (1986), the US 
Supreme Court established the modern standard of proof to determine the existence of 
concerted action with the power of circumstantial evidence. The court held that ‘the 
correct standard is that there must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of 
independent action by the defendants. That is, there must be direct or circumstantial 
evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the defendants have a conscious 
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective’.114 
In the last two cases – namely Brooke Group (1993)115  and Wallace Bank of 
Bartlett (1995)116 – the Supreme Court has clearly stated that conscious parallelism in 
                                                                 
110 Ibid., 539-540. 
111 Ibid., 541. 
112 Carl Kaysen, Antitrust policy: an economic and legal analysis [by] Carl Kaysen and Donald F. 
Turner. Cambridge: Harvard University Press., 1959:108-109 
113  Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the antitrust laws: A suggested approach,  Stanford Law 
Review (1969): 1584. 
114 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1986); See also 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). 
115 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.  133 S. Ct. 2578 (1993). 
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itself is not unlawful as parallel behavior can merely be the outcome of natural, 
interdependent behavior.  In order to infer collusion based on the fact of conscious 
parallelism, the Courts would require additional evidence, which they have described as 
plus-factors. Thus, the US has been starting to apply ‘parallelism plus’ standard, which 
implies that more than mere ‘conscious parallelism’ or interdependent behavior’ must be 
established to infer an agreement. As described in Chapter I, this requirement for 
additional factors pertains to facilitating practices that may be present. In particular, the 
public price announcement practice can easily facilitate collusion if it is used to signal or 
as an invitation to collude. 
 
       2.1.2. Facilitating practice vs. tacit collusion  
In principle, under US antitrust law, a unilateral disclosure of information does 
not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. This is because unilateral conduct does not 
constitute the agreement required to establish an infringement of Section 1.117  Cases 
where anti-competitive unilateral disclosure of information is also present usually are 
subject to the consideration under Section 5118 of the Federal Trade Commission Act or 
Section 2119 of the Sherman Act. Nonetheless, there is an exception, according to which 
in certain circumstances, unilateral price disclosures can facilitate collusion among firms 
and this can be considered an infringement of Section 1.120  
The DOJ most frequently has pursued signaling conduct under Section 1, which 
prohibits ‘[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy’ in unreasonable restraint of 
trade. To prove a Section 1 violation, a plaintiff must show the existence of an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
116 55 F. 3d 1166,1168 (6th Cir.1995) 
117 OECD, Unilateral Disclosure of Information with Anticompetitive Effects 2012: 172.  
118 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits unfair methods of competition.  
119 Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits efforts to monopolize, or attempts to monopolize, 
including acts to combine or conspire with another person to monopolize.  
120 OECD, Unilateral Disclosure of Information with Anticompetitive Effects 2012: 175.  
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agreement that unreasonably restrains trade, and that affects interstate commerce.121 
Like any contract, proving that a Section 1 agreement exists often requires showing both 
the presence of an offer and acceptance by a competitor. In a typical Section 1 signaling 
case, a plaintiff uses the signal as evidence an offer was made and then relies upon 
subsequent statements or conduct by a competitor to show acceptance of the offer.122  
A Section 1 challenge to signaling presents two hurdles for the plaintiff. The 
first is determining that a public statement was an actual offer to enter into an anti-
competitive agreement. Almost all companies make public statements or engage in some 
public chatter that likely is reviewed by competitors, whether at trade association 
meetings, investor presentations, and even through pricing activities. Most of these 
statements or activities are part of the company’s legitimate, ordinary business activities. 
Companies describe their capabilities to customers, announce price changes, and inform 
investors of plans and financial results. 123 For a Section 1 claim to prevail, the plaintiff 
and later the factfinder must sift through this overwhelming volume of routine 
communications to discern a clear signal that cannot be reconciled with legitimate 
business conduct.  
Several courts have dismissed Section 1 claims where the alleged signaling had 
been ambiguous. For example, in Hall v. United Air Lines, a putative class of travel 
agent plaintiffs alleged that several US airlines conspired to cut or eliminate travel agent 
commissions through signaling.124 Plaintiffs pointed to a series of trade press articles, 
trade interviews, and letters to trade publications as signals among a irlines to eliminate 
commissions. The court rejected the allegation these statements were signals sufficient 
to support a claim under Section 1, noting the airlines had legitimate purposes for the 
communications that were “sufficient to rebut any implication that the letters were an 
                                                                 
121 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58. 
122 E.g., In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1352 (N.D. Ga. 
2010). 
123 See, e.g., id. at 1362. 
124 296 F. Supp. 2d 652. 
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attempt to communicate with competitors.” Without an offer there could be no Section 1 
agreement.  
The second hurdle for Section 1 plaintiffs are finding evidence of a competitor’s 
acceptance. If a competitor does not respond to a signal, there is no Section 1 liability 
because there is no agreement.125 For example, in United States v. American Airlines,126 
a federal district court rejected the DOJ’s attempt to hold American Airlines liable under 
Section 1 for unilateral statements by its then-CEO. In what today would be labeled an 
invitation to collude, the CEO suggested to his counterpart at Braniff Airways that both 
carriers should raise prices by 20 percent. Braniff’s president not only declined but 
reported the conversation to the DOJ. In the DOJ challenge to this conduct, under both 
Sections 1 and 2, the district court rejected the Section 1 claim given that Section 1 only 
prohibits actual agreements among competitors; “it does not reach attempts.”127  
Most signals are less explicit. For example, the Hall plaintiffs alleged signals 
made in news interviews and correspondence with trade publications. The DOJ’s 
ongoing airline investigation apparently was triggered by public statements on the part 
of executives on ‘capacity discipline’. In such cases, it is hard to determine with 
confidence that there was a signal or offer to discern whether recipients ‘accepted’ a 
signaled offer or just made parallel actions backed by independent business justifications. 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, leader/follower behavior and ‘conscious 
parallelism’ are bona fide competitive interaction and do not alone violate Section 1.  
Showing acceptance to a signal requires something more than similar conduct ; it 
requires demonstrating such conduct that cannot be justified or explained as independent.  
The district court in Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee grappled with these issues in 
deciding in favor of the defendant airlines’ motion to dismiss. The putative class of 
passenger plaintiffs claimed Delta and AirTran conspired, through public signals on 
                                                                 
125 Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). 
126 743 F.2d 1114. 
127  United States v. Am. Airlines Inc., 570 F. Supp. 654, 657 (N.D. Tex. 1983), reviewed on other 
grounds, 743 F.2d at 1119 where the court had stated that noting “our decision that the government 
has stated a [Section 2] claim does not add attempt to violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act”). 
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earnings calls and at industry conferences, to implement the first-bag fee and reduce 
capacity on routes in and out of Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. While 
the court declined to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Section 1 claims, it noted the difficulties 
these plaintiffs will face in proving an agreement due to Delta’s “potentially legitimate 
and lawful justifications” for imposing a first-bag fee following its merger with 
Northwest Airlines, which already had implemented a fee. The court also noted that the 
airlines might have cut capacity due to the “uncertain economic climate” in 2008 and not 
because of any anti-competitive motivation, which would “provide Defendants a viable 
defense” to plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, even if the plaintiffs could show a signal, the 
defendants potentially could escape liability if they can demonstrate legitimate business 
justifications for their subsequent behavior. These two critical issues demonstrate that 
Section 1 is ill-suited to asserting antitrust liability based upon unilateral signaling 
conduct. Even if there is an explicit ‘offer’ via signaling conduct, there can be no Section 
1 liability if a competitor does not ‘accept’. Section 1 does not prohibit unilateral 
behavior, so the unilateral act of sending a signal cannot itself violate Section 1.  
In sum, antitrust challenges to invitations to collude and other ‘signaling’ 
communications are on the increase. In the last several years, both US antitrust agencies 
have launched extensive investigations, and the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
has obtained consent decrees in multiple actions arising from unilateral statements by 
business executives. Nonetheless, courts have refused to find that a unilateral statement 
by a competitor, without additional evidence, can provide the basis to infer an 
‘agreement’ for the purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Courts have, almost 
invariably, rejected claims that signaling can support a monopolization claim under 
Sherman Act Section 2. And the federal courts have not substantiated the FTC’s 
challenge to signaling under the FTC Act Section 5. Despite this questionable statutory 
authority, the DOJ and FTC continue to pursue such unilateral conduct. 
46 
 
 
 
          2.2. The European Union  
     Competition law and policy play a significant role in ensuring market unity and 
the promotion of economic development in the EU. The legal foundation for EU 
competition law is to be found in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The European 
Commission, supported by the European courts, has further developed the framework for 
competition policy in the EU.  
In the early 1980s, the EU’s approach began to vary and to 
become progressively ‘American’ in its unsentimental approach towards cartels. 128 
Furthermore, following the US’s successful experience, the EU has implemented its first 
leniency program 129  in 1996 and effectively amended the program in 2006, which 
significantly developed anti-cartel enforcement.  The program has proven crucial to 
uncovering cartels in the EU, with the majority of cases in recent years stemming from 
evidence obtained from a leniency applicant. Unlike the US model, the EU leniency 
program is not backed by the threat of criminal sanctions, but the EU has significantly 
increased its penalties for cartel offenses in recent years to the extent that the EU 
Advocate-General has called them quasi-criminal. 130 
Hardcore cartels are also considered to be the most severe infringements of 
competition rules at national level within EU Member States. The European 
Commission’s leniency notice considers hardcore cartels to be the most severe 
                                                                 
128 John Duns, Arlen Duke, and Brendan Sweeney, eds. Comparative competition law. Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2015: 309. 
129 The EU leniency program has a different structure of exemption and reduction from fines.  First, 
unlike the US’s program, the EU leniency program grants not only exemption but also reduction of 
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reduction. 
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restrictions of competition in the EU market, which ultimately result in increased prices 
and reduced choice for the consumer. 131  
The European Commission can only impose an administrative fine of up to 10 % 
of the annual (group) turnover132 on the ‘undertakings’ (i.e., the firms) participating in 
the cartel. Infringements of Article 101(1) of the Treaty on Functioning of the European 
Union (hereafter, referred as TFEU) are not of a criminal law nature. Nevertheless, some 
EU Member States may also criminally prosecute individuals participating in a cartel 
based on their national regulatory regimes. Even though the EU authorities are still 
unable to impose prison terms or fines on individuals for antitrust violations, they have 
become much more aggressive in anti-cartel enforcement, and there is currently some 
debate as to the advisability of adding a criminal law component to EU competition 
policy.133  
The TFEU prohibits cartel conduct in Article 101 (1). Article 101(3) TFEU 
provides exemptions to certain restrictive agreements, decisions or concerted practices 
fulfilling specific criteria. However, hardcore cartel agreements are most unlikely to fall 
within the exempting criteria of Article 101(3) TFEU. Hardcore cartels are regarded as a 
per se restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. As these 
are restrictions ‘by object’ it is not necessary to prove the anti-competitive effects of a 
cartel.  
 
       2.2.1. Regulation of tacit collusion in the EU  
The prohibition of cartels and other agreements that could disrupt free competition 
in the EU internal market is stipulated in Article 101 of the TFEU. Article 101 reads,  
                                                                 
131  The Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (‘the 
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“The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between the 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market.” 
Article 101 applies three forms of coordination: agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices.134  In general, EU 
competition law applies two separate notions to define cartel conduct: ‘agreement’ and 
‘concerted practice.’ Nonetheless, it should be noted here that neither the term 
‘concerted practice’ nor ‘agreement’ are defined in the TFEU.   
Unlike US antitrust law, the EU separately uses the term ‘concerted practice’ in 
addition to the ‘agreement’ within the scope of Article 101. At first glance, the US and 
EU approaches might diverge. However, the US defines ‘agreement’ very broadly, 
therefore special provision for ‘concerted practice’ is unnecessary, whereas the EU 
defines ‘agreement’ somewhat legalistic.135 The law as it applies in the EU seems to 
suggest that there is not much legal difference in the meaning of ‘agreement’ and 
‘concerted practice’, as ‘concerted practices’ are considered forms of collusion that fall 
short of an ‘agreement’136. 
The notion of ‘agreement’ in EU competition law is very similar to the notion of 
‘agreement’ in US antitrust law. An agreement is found when parties express their joint 
intention to act on the market in a specific manner.  Additionally, the form of expression 
is unimportant – whether it is formally written, or oral, or in any other forms of 
                                                                 
134  Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty establishing the 
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communication – as long as it constitutes a faithful expression of the parties' intention. 
Thus, the concept of ‘agreement’ sufficiently implies a concurrence of wills between at 
least two parties. 137  This broad and liberal definition of the agreement allows the 
application of Article 101 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) to 
loosely formalized forms of cooperation, and it enables the EU Commission and courts 
to ‘close the net’ on a variety of expressions of consensus that go beyond written 
contracts.  
On the other hand, the notion of ‘concerted practice’ is problematic in the EU as 
there is debate as to whether the term ‘concerted practice’ covers tacit collusion, given 
that there is no provision expressly addressing tacit collusion in the TFEU.  A crucial 
issue is whether specific parallel price increases in oligopolistic markets may be 
considered concerted practices.  
When Article 101 had been drafted, lawmakers were familiar with the problem of 
tacit collusion that had emerged in the US courts. Therefore, during the negotiation of 
the TFEU, it was well known to EU lawmakers that parallelism or tacit collusion might 
also raise similar complex antitrust issues for EU antitrust authorities.138  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to consider, that the term ‘concerted practice’ was included intentionally 
along with ‘agreements’ specifically to cover all forms of coordination, including tacit 
collusion. Nevertheless, due to the considerable influence of US antitrust law on EU 
competition law, the practical application of ‘concerted practice’ in the EU has gone in 
the same way as in the US.   
 An early attempt to define the notion of ‘concerted practice’ in EU law was in the 
Dyestuffs case in 1972. 139  The Court defined ‘concerted practice’ as a form of 
                                                                 
137 See, Bayer v. Commission, (Case T-41 /96, 2000 E.C.R. 11-3383, para. 69.) 
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coordination between firms that, without having reached the stage where an agreement 
has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between firms for the 
risks of competition. 140  Subsequently, the Court has noted that a concerted practice 
needs not have all the elements of a contract, however, concerted practice may arise out 
of coordination which becomes obvious from the firms’ behavior in the market.141  
Considering the evidential value of ‘parallel behavior’, the court stated that parallel 
behavior might not in itself be identified with concerted practice, but may provide 
circumstantial evidence. 142  In other words, the Court indicated that parallel behavior 
would not be equivalent to concerted practice but may be one of the elements used to 
prove its existence.  
A few years later, in this Suiker Unie V. Commission (1975) case143 the court ruled 
that it was not necessary for the firms to behave based on a plan to come within the 
scope of collusion. It was recognized that any direct or indirect contact between 
operators influencing the behavior of firms would be sufficient. Similarly, the decision 
of the Court in Suiker Unie (1975), clarified that the Court was prepared to accept that 
intelligent adaptation to the existing and anticipated conduct of competitors in the 
oligopolistic market was legitimate144 and therefore that parallel behavior in an oligopoly 
would not in and of itself constitute collusion (i.e., ‘concerted practice’). The decisions 
in Dyestuffs and Suiker Unie appear to give rise to a notion of ‘concerted practice’ that 
requires two elements: the existence of direct or indirect reciprocal contact  between 
undertakings aimed at knowingly removing uncertainty as to future market behavior, and 
then subsequent behavior in the market under that concertation. In these cases, the ECJ 
insists that each firm should determine independently the policy which it intends to 
adopt on the common market. This obligation strictly prohibits any direct or indirect 
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communication between firms, the object or effect whereof is either to influence the 
behavior on the market of rivals, to disclose to other firms the course of conduct which 
they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market.145 Thus, 
the only way for firms to escape the application of Article 101 is to demonstrate to the 
Court that they had reached their market decisions independently and without prior 
knowledge of the strategies and plans of their competitors.146 
Then, in CRAM and Rheinzink v. Commission (1985), 147  the court precisely 
demonstrated that the EU Commission has to provide clear proof that parallel conduct is 
the result of coordinated action between firms, and therefore reliance on parallelism 
alone to infer collusion is impermissible.148  
In Woodpulp (1993), 149  the Court clarified that ‘parallel conduct cannot be 
regarded as furnishing proof of collusion unless concertation constitutes the only 
plausible explanation for such conduct. 150  That is, the Court stated that concerted 
practice could only be inferred from parallelism of behavior if the concertation is the 
only explanation for it.151 Also, relying upon expert testimony on oligopolistic market 
structure, the ECJ ruled that “the parallelism of prices and the price trends may be 
satisfactorily explained by the oligopolistic tendencies of the market and by the specific 
circumstances prevailing in certain periods.”152 In other words, the Court has indicated 
that oligopolistic interdependence may serve as a plausib le explanation for the 
parallelism in an oligopoly, and therefore the exclusion of conscious parallelism from 
the scope of Article 101. The ECJ had appointed a group of economic experts to check 
the market conditions. After the experts’ examination, the court concluded that market 
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characteristics in that period were a plausible explanation for the price uniformity than 
concertation.153 Nonetheless, the experts did not mention that such market characteristics 
were the sole plausible explanation for the price uniformity. Thus, it was sufficient for 
the ECJ that there were alternative explanations apart from collusion.  
With respect to the relationship between the notions of ‘agreement’ and ‘concerted 
practice’ in EU competition law, Professor Odudu154 has stated the following: 
  “Since concerted practice is included to capture conduct not already caught by 
"agreement," and since agreement catches common intention, there must be 
something distinctive about common intention in concerted practice. An idea 
underlying some cases and commentary is that common intention in the agreement 
is expressed in a manner that gives rise to (legal) obligation, where common 
intention in concerted practice is not so expressed”. 
Professor Odudu suggests a broader reading of ‘concerted practices.’ He argues 
that ‘concerted practice’ adds nothing to the notion of ‘agreement’ if it does not reach 
unilateral behavior in the form of conscious parallelism.   
 
       2.2.2. Facilitating practice vs. tacit collusion 
As mentioned previously, anti-competitive concerns may arise with regard to 
unilateral advance public price announcements of future prices or the disclosure of 
sensitive information. According to the European Commission’s Guidelines on 
Horizontal Agreements, it is a general principle that when a firm makes a genuine public 
announcement, there is no violation of Article 101(1). However, the Guidelines stipulate 
two exceptions to this principle: a) public price announcements that constitute an 
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“invitation to collude”; b) unilateral announcements that would help firms reach a 
common understanding of coordination: 155  
“[…] the possibility of finding a concerted practice cannot be excluded, for 
example in a situation where such an announcement was followed by public 
announcements by other competitors, not least because strategic responses of 
competitors to each other’s public announcements (which, to take one instance, 
might involve readjustments of their own earlier announcements to 
announcements made by competitors) could prove to be a strategy for reaching a 
common understanding about the terms of coordination.”  
In other words, the guidelines state that when a firm makes a unilateral public 
price announcement, this does not constitute collusive conduct within the meaning of 
Article 101(1). Nevertheless, depending on the facts, the possibility of finding concerted 
practice (tacit collusion) cannot be excluded in a situation where such an announcement 
was followed by public announcements by other firms, not least because of strategic 
responses of competitors to each other’s public announcements. 
Nonetheless, due to a shortage of case law on price signaling, the circumstances 
under which price signaling becomes an unlawful anti-competitive practice are still 
unclear. This shortage can be explained by the fact that the majority of firms subject to a 
price signaling investigation have opted for behavioral commitment decisions, rather 
than litigate and thus risk an often significant administrative surcharge. A recent 
example can be the container liner shipping investigation by the European Commission. 
In this case, the European Commission had concerns that the container liner shipping 
companies’ practice of announcing their future price intentions to increase their prices 
may harm competition. These announcements, known as ‘General Rate Increases’ or 
‘GRI announcements’ only indicated the increase in US dollars per transported container 
unit (as an amount or percentage of the change), the affected trade route s, and the 
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planned date of implementation. The GRI announcements were generally made three to 
five weeks before their implementation, and during that period other container liner 
shipping companies would announce similar increases. The European Commission’s 
concern was that the GRI announcements might not provide full information on the new 
prices to customers but merely allowed them to explore each other’s pricing intentions 
and subsequently coordinate their behavior. As a result of the case, the European 
Commission ordered the container liner shipping companies to stop publishing the GRI 
announcements in their then-current form. Also, in order for customers to understand, 
the announcements ought to become more transparent and ought to include at least the 
five main elements of the total price such as the base rate, bunker charges, security 
charges, terminal handling charges, and peak season charges. Furthermore, any future 
announcement shall be binding on the carriers as a maximum price and will not be made 
more than 31 days before its entry into force.  In the case when a firm breaks one of these 
rules, the European Commission may impose a fine of up to 10 percent of the company’s 
worldwide turnover, without having to find a competition law infringement. 156 For their 
part, the 15 container liner shipping companies have also offered commitments in order 
to address the European Commission’s concerns relating to concerted practice through 
price signaling. 
                                                                 
156 https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2016/07/antitrust-matters-july-
2016/signalling-conclusion/ 
55 
 
 
          2.3. Japan 
Japan adopted its competition law under the unilateral influence of the US as part 
of the economic liberalization in 1947. Officially, the law is titled ‘Act on Prohibition of 
Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade’, which is also commonly known 
as the ‘Japanese Antimonopoly Act’ (hereinafter, the ‘JAMA’). The initial draft of the 
JAMA was modeled after the US antitrust laws, and, as enacted, it was stricter than US 
antitrust laws. However, due to cultural, social and economic differences, the law has 
been amended which has resulted in the current JAMA being significantly different to 
US antitrust law. These differences have led to different competitive environments.157 
In Japan, cartel practices are a complicated issue given that horizontal coordination 
has often been rooted in the traditional business practices of Japanese companies.158 In 
particular, bid rigging – especially in the construction sector – has historically been a 
crucial area of cartel control in Japan. Bid rigging was regarded as a proper practice to 
prevent bankruptcy, maintain employment and avoid ‘dumping’ in the form of cut-rate 
service and defective construction before World War II.159 Even after Japan’s Criminal 
Code criminalized bid rigging in 1940, the idea that collusive bidding was illegal has not 
been fully espoused in societal norms. 160 The dissolution of the super-conglomerate 
zaibatsu groups in the post-war period was ironically one of the reasons that cartels of 
suppliers in Japan became active.  It created stiff competition among suppliers, who then 
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resorted to cartel conduct since they could no longer benefit from the stable demand of 
producers belonging to the zaibatsu. 161 
 The surcharge system has been introduced after the first oil crisis as a response to 
consumer complaints about the number of cartels being formed. 162  Until this 
introduction of the administrative surcharge, it had been impossible to recover from 
enterprises the extra profits they had gained using unlawful price cartels.163  The current 
administrative surcharges are up to 10% of the total sales of product at issue from the 
previous three years. 164  In addition to administrative sanctions, firms and individuals 
could face criminal sanctions for cartel violations. 165    The criminal penalty is 
imprisonment up to five years or a fine of up to five million yen in case of individuals 
and a fine up to five thousand million yen in case of firms.166 If, following investigation, 
the Japan Fair Trade Commission (the ‘JFTC’) determines that a case is egregious and 
has a significant effect on people’s lives, or that the administrative remedies are not 
sufficient, it may file for a criminal prosecution by  the Prosecutor General.  
The JFTC is the government agency responsible for enforcing the JAMA and may 
impose cease-and-desist orders and administrative fines (known as ‘surcharges’) on 
firms that it finds to have engaged in cartel conduct.167 For decades, enforcement of the 
law had been lax and, as a result, the Antimonopoly Act did not feature much in 
Japanese society. 168  Cartel investigations became more active since the 1960s due to 
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price-fixing cartels and other illegal activities that were contributing to a rise in 
consumer prices facilitated by tight oligopolistic market structures. 169 Since 2006, anti-
cartel enforcement has become more effective thanks to enhancing the JFTC’s 
investigative powers and the introduction of a leniency program. The leniency system 
has become one of the primary drivers of the Japanese cartel enforcement system, and 
indeed, today the JFTC considers the leniency system as a critical investigative tool.  
 
      2.3.1. Regulation of tacit collusion in Japan 
Cartels are referred to as an unreasonable restraint on trade in Japan.170 JAMA 
prohibits cartels by Article 3, and the definition of cartel conduct is stipulated in Article 
2 (6), which defines it as follows:  
“[…]business activities, by which any enterprise, by contract, agreement or any other 
means irrespective of its name, in concert with other enterprises, mutually restrict or 
conduct their business activities[…], facilities or counterparties, thereby causing, 
contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any particular 
field of trade.” 
With respect to the prohibited act, it is generally called ‘Kyodo-Koi’ (共同行為 
in Japanese), which means ‘concerted activity.’ The terms ‘contract’ and ‘agreement’ 
are simply the projection of the practice into reality but do not bear any significance to 
the classification of the conduct. The JAMA does not distinguish between agreements 
and concerted practices as is the case with the EU.  
Nonetheless, similar to EU competition law, the JAMA is deemed to cover the 
notions of ‘agreement’ and ‘concerted practice.’ Japanese competition law has been 
designed to also regulate such coordinative behavior on the part of firms beyond 
behavior that pertains to their explicit agreement. In other words, the cartel definition in 
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the JAMA includes conscious parallelism. 171  For instance, Professor Negishi, an 
eminent Japanese competition law expert, argues that the definition of cartel conduct in 
the JAMA has the term Kyodo-Suiko’ (共同遂行 in Japanese), which actually implies 
concertation as a result of independent actions of entrepreneurs, and also thoroughly 
covers the notion of conscious parallel behavior. 172  Therefore, this term also fits 
conduct such as unilateral price disclosure. 
However, due to the influence of US antitrust law, Japan also has taken a 
conservative legal approach towards the conscious parallelism phenomenon.  As a 
consequence, Japan makes ‘Sogo-Kosoku’ (相互拘束  in Japanese) (i.e., ‘mutual 
restriction’) a central requirement in the definition of cartel conduct by ignoring the 
term Kyodo-Suiko. 173  That is, collusion is described as a phenomenon whereby 
enterprises mutually restrain their actions in a market.  
For a finding that a cartel has been formed, there first needs to be mutual consent 
or agreement between firms in some way.  Such mutual consent among firms 
concerning collusion is defined as the ‘communication of intent’. There are no certain 
or specific forms necessary for a finding that there has been a communication of intent.  
Communication of intent includes moderate communications of intent such an explicit 
as well as a tacit agreement of mutual restraint.174 Tacit agreement is determined to be 
such when it is considered that there is sufficient evidence of actual fulfillment and 
maintenance of such understanding. 175   It requires evidence that specific 
communication conduct has taken place among firms. Thus, it is clear that the 
definition of ‘communication of intent’ implies an action in order to ensure the 
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foreseeability of the activities on the part of firms. Therefore, in Japan, parallel conduct 
alone is an insufficient factor in constituting evidence of a cartel176 without evidence of 
exchange of information or communication among firms. This is because, according to 
the JAMA, conscious parallelism lacks the requirement of “mutual restriction, as 
companies do not mutually communicate their intentions regarding their competitive 
conduct. That is, they are not restricted mutually and do not have competition 
restrictive intentions. Therefore, when the JFTC judges conscious parallelism as a cartel, 
it is necessary to prove an existence of communication of intent among firms”.177 
In Japan, the notion of ‘communication of intent’ is chiefly defined in bid-
rigging cases.178 There are a few price-fixing cases, where there have been findings of 
‘communication of intent’ on the basis of circumstantial evidence.  
In the Toshiba Chemical case, the court clarified the essential criteria for the 
necessary finding of ‘communication of intent’ to prove collusion.  The Tokyo High 
Court in the Toshiba Chemical case had stated:  
“Recognition and intention of the entrepreneurs should be considered by examining 
various circumstances before and after the price-raising, and the evaluation of whether 
there is mutual recognition or acceptance among entrepreneurs regarding the price-
raising or not.”179 
 Thus, in the absence of any explicit agreement, the existence of a tacit agreement 
may be proven by showing the following facts: First, the existence of a prior exchange 
of information and opinions among the parties concerned. It is sufficient to show that 
an exchange of opinions took place. 180  Second, the content of negotiations must be 
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known to regulators; for example, specific standards can be demonstrated concerning 
the rate or breadth of price increases.181 Third, the uniformity of actions as a result,182 
which can be parallel pricing. 
In Toshiba Chemical case, the proof of the existence of a communication of 
intention among firms has been defined in the following three ways. First, firms have 
exchanged their opinions regarding the price of the product concerned at the meetings 
of the trade association. The evidence that indicated this fact was the statement of 
participants in the meetings and the trade association meeting’s participants’ list. 
Second, when the three most significant companies had expressed their intention to 
raise the price, there had been no objection by the other five companies at the meeting. 
Further evidence was also the statement of participants in the meeting.  Third, all eight 
companies gave instructions in their offices to raise the price, and announced and 
carried out price increase for users.  The statements of persons involved, press release 
of the price increase and notice of price increase sent to their customers where the 
evidence that proved the concertation. Consequently, if along with parallel behavior, a 
prior exchange of information has taken place, and even though the content of the 
information exchanged is unclear, the conduct is likely to be found collusive as there is 
a strong causal link between the prior exchange of information and the subsequent 
parallel behavior. That is, it proves that a prior exchange of information has resulted in 
concerted parallel conduct in a market.  
The Japanese literature presents Toshiba Chemical as a leading case in defining 
the meaning of ‘communication of intent.’ Nonetheless, whether Toshiba Chemical’s 
definition of ‘communication of intent’ should apply to an oligopolistic situation is a 
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controversial issue, as it had involved eight firms, which implies less market 
concentration. Therefore, with regard to this point, not many scholars agree with the 
Tokyo High Court’s view in Toshiba Chemical. For instance, according to Professor 
Shoda, 183  it is possible to infer collusion based on price similarity and economic 
analysis of the market (economic evidence). Professor Negishi, argues that it is almost 
impossible to separate mere oligopolistic parallelism from tacit collusion just based on 
the notion of ‘communication of intent,’ because ‘communication of intent’ merely 
describes interdependence.  He suggests that the problem of oligopoly should rather be 
considered from the viewpoint of the objectives of competition law and legislative 
intent, which is the promotion of fair and free competition. 184 Furthermore, Professor 
Negishi also notes that conscious parallel behavior does not differ from intentional 
price-fixing conduct, and therefore the prohibition of conscious parallelism does not 
contradict the position of the JAMA.    
 
      2.3.2. Price signaling vs. tacit collusion 
In Modifier cartel case,  the JFTC found that three firms had agreed to mark up the 
selling price of modifiers used for polyvinyl chloride plastics, and then issued a decision 
order to eliminate such conduct on November 9th of 2009. 185  These companies 
reciprocally exchanged information verifying the rate and strategy of price increases for 
modifiers. Kureha was the first company who made a public price announcement on 8 
November, and then it requested other firms to follow its pricing. Following with 
Kureha’s price action, Mitsubishi also publicly announced its price elevation on 14 
November. Then, Kaneka also made a public statement on price elevation on 21 
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November. The issue with this case was that communication connected to coordinated 
behavior is reasonable in some circumstances. That is, a firm’s press release was deemed  
to be its communication of price elevations. In other words, the firm’s press release was 
one of the factors that led to the notion ‘mutually’ being invoked. Therefore, a firm’s 
public press release can be interpreted as proof of mutual communication to raise prices, 
if some other communication, such as collectively organized price elevations and the 
exchange of price information during negotiations, may be verified as well.186  
Another relevant price-fixing case concerning the standard of proof for a finding 
of a communication of intention is the International Air Freight Forwarding case.187 
The JFTC imposed an administrative surcharge on fourteen international freight 
forwarders condemning them for cartel formation regarding additional fuel surcharges 
and airport security charges to air-cargo service charges due to the rapid price increase 
on fuel surcharges around the world. According to the JFTC, the 12 firms had 
negotiated price coordination at meetings of the Japan Air Cargo Forwarders 
Association, and ultimately that arrangement lasted from 2004 to 2007. They dissolved 
the cartel only after EU and US anti-trust authorities began investigations in 2007. The 
problem, in this case, is that the reasonableness of communication is only linked to 
coordinated conduct. This communication enables firms to share confidential trade 
information among rivals; therefore, such a situation would never have happened under 
the conditions of free competition. Consequently, an anti-competitive agreement among 
firms was likely to have taken place. The firms had claimed that the price information 
about new surcharges had been public. Nonetheless,  carefully examining the details of 
disclosed information – particularly the names, content, status, and results of 
negotiations with their trading partners – the courts concluded that the information was 
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typical that would usually be shared by firms, and decided that the exchange of 
information had constituted evidence of indirect communication.188  
Comparing this case with the modifier cartel case mentioned previously, the 
reasonableness of communication represents a decisive factor for the finding of 
coordinated conduct. If the interfirm communication in question is not reasonable 
within a business context, then the existence of communication may be suggestive of 
coordination. Reasonableness is justified from the perspective of the following factors: 
(i) consumers, (ii) stakeholders, and (iii) society and the public. For example, a public 
price announcement can be reasonable in terms of accountability before consumers, but 
it might also be difficult to justify why a firm announces its confidential trade 
information. 189 
 
          2.4. Comparison and concluding remarks 
The overview of competition laws in the three jurisdictions considered in the 
foregoing suggests the presence of more similarities than differences regarding legal 
approaches towards the issue of conscious parallelism in the US, the EU, and Japan.  For 
instance, the legal interpretation of the notion of ‘agreement’ has been defined similarly:  
190  a ‘meeting of minds’ in the US; a ‘concurrence of will’ in the EU; and a 
‘communication of intent’ in Japan. Furthermore, in all three jurisdictions, to prove 
collusion courts demand something more than just showing the presence of parallel 
conduct. Also, there is no clear answer as to exactly what circumstantial evidence would 
suffice to prove collusion.  
In the US, high administrative surcharges and severe criminal sanctions for cartel 
conduct have necessitated high evidentiary standards to prove collusion in order to avoid 
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false positives. Although, courts were initially in their decisions prone to considering 
parallel pricing as sufficient evidence of tacit collusion, courts in subsequent leading 
cases have undisputedly ruled that conscious parallelism is not in and of itself a violation 
of competition law, and that supplementary ‘plus factors’ are necessary to establish the 
existence of a cartel agreement. Nowadays, US antitrust law acknowledges that for a 
finding of tacit collusion, ‘plus factors’ should be demonstrated along with parallel 
conduct. Nonetheless, plus factor analysis has failed to distinguish lawful parallel 
conduct from illegal concertation. Most of the plus factors share similar characteristics 
with interdependence thus causing some confusion for courts. As a result, cases relying 
on plus factors often result in a refusal on the part of the courts to infer collusion based 
on circumstantial evidence.  Thus, whether and when parallel conduct constitutes tacit 
collusion remains has not been sufficiently settled in US competition law.  
In particular, the use of some facilitating practice as a plus factor raises some 
issues, in particular when advance price announcement practices are used as a price 
signal. The review of price signaling under Sections 1, 2, and 5 of the Sherman Act 
demonstrates the uncertainty as to whether signaling is unlawful. As a matter of fact, a 
unilateral signal lacks the ‘agreement’ element for a Section 1 violation and lacks the 
exclusionary conduct requirement for Section 2 that the FTC has used to challenge 
unilateral signaling conduct under Section 5.  The difficulty with the use of Section 5, is 
that it creates significant uncertainty as to when a unilateral statement may later be seen 
to violate antitrust laws. And while the FTC has a string o f consent decrees resulting 
from bare invitations to collude, even the Commissioners sometimes disagree over 
whether a statement constitutes an ‘invitation’ or not. Rather than relying on Section 2 or 
Section 5 to target signaling conduct, it is better to analyze signaling exclusively under 
Section 1: if the signal results in an anti-competitive agreement, then the signal may be 
challenged; otherwise, the unilateral communication should not be actionable under 
antitrust laws. 191 
                                                                 
191 https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4e17/7cad676129cedd366a021e323969a925b3a9.pdf 
65 
 
EU competition law employs two controversial notions in defining cartel conduct: 
‘agreement’ and ‘concerted practice’. Even though the notion of concerted practice is 
deemed to extend over such forms of cartels that do not involve an agreement, EU courts 
have made it clear that parallel behavior in and of itself does not constitute a concerted 
practice within the meaning of Article 101 (1) of the TFEU. Parallel behavior by 
competitors can, at most, constitute circumstantial evidence for the finding of concerted 
practice. Also, under EU competition law, firms escape antitrust liability if another 
plausible explanation for the parallelism of behavior can be adduced. In an oligopolistic 
market, defendants will invariably try to rely on the explanation of the natural outcome 
of oligopolistic interdependence for their parallel behavior. Under tight oligopolistic 
market conditions, collusion is then not the only plausible explanation for parallel 
behavior, as the court has explicitly recognized intelligent alignment as an explanation of 
parallel behavior due to interdependence in oligopolistic markets.192   
Price signaling in the EU also can be found to have pro- and anti-competition 
effects, depending on the circumstances. The definitive question with regard to the 
particular market conduct may be if any valid business explanations exist for firms to 
behave in this specific manner. If an undertaking cannot provide a legitimate reason for 
its price signaling, and it is possible to determine that the announcements were not made 
because of an undertakings individual intention, these factors may constitute sufficient 
evidence of collusion. Furthermore, if the advance price announcements do not make no 
firm commitment towards consumers, such as a maximal price limits, this may be 
considered tacit collusion. 
In Japan, there is no distinction of cartel conduct into ‘agreement’ or ‘concerted 
practice’.  To constitute a cartel, it is necessary that there is mutual consent or a 
‘communication of intent’ between firms. Circumstantial evidence in Japan may also 
prove the existence of a communication of intent. As the case law demonstrates, a 
communication of intent may be found when the following three are present: (i) ex-ante 
exchange of information, (ii) content of the exchange of information, (iii) and same and 
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similar ex-post actions.   In practice, to prove the existence of communication of intent 
between firms, it is necessary to show evidence of actual fulfillment of such intention 
by specific communicative action. Therefore, mere parallel behavior without 
communication evidence would fail to establish collusion in Japan.  Thus, in Japan, the 
‘parallelism plus’ doctrine is more coherent. The case law has clarified that, along with 
parallel behavior, evidence as to communication should be demonstrated by the 
competition authority in order to establish cartel conduct. Practically, it implies the 
competition authority should identify the actual conduct of exchange of information 
among firms. As a result, such relatively high evidentiary standard makes the task of 
proving collusion rarely possible when solely based on circumstantial evidence. 
Thus, an overview of cartel regulation in the US, EU, and Japan would suggest that 
courts are reluctant to infer tacit collusion from consciously parallel behavior. Courts 
have faced this seemingly insurmountable dilemma as they cannot reasonably expect 
firms not to react to their competitors’ pricing behavior. Judicial practice has clarified 
that mere conscious parallelism is not sufficient to imply tacit collusion without 
additional evidence, excluding the independent behavior of firms.  However, there is still 
no clear answer as to what additional evidence suffices for an inference of collusion. In 
terms of applying the rules of competition to tacit collusion to demonstrate its 
occurrence, facilitating practices may help to determine whether the conduct in 
oligopolistic settings sets the conditions for tacit collusion or simple oligopolistic 
interdependence. Thus, if these practices pose risks for competition, it may be justifiable 
for competition enforcers to seek to intervene.193 
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Chapter 3. ANALYSIS OF SCHOLARLY OPINIONS ON TACIT COLLUSION 
It has become clear from Chapter 2, that courts across the three jurisdictions within 
the scope of the present dissertation generally do not consider mere conscious 
parallelism as tacit collusion.  Not all scholars agree with the courts on this issue, and 
have different views as to how tacit collusion should be treated under competition rules. 
The oligopoly problem has been exhaustively documented in the literature. The 
complexity of regulation of cartel conduct in the oligopolistic market began to be 
recognized in the 1950s. Many scholars have since proposed theories and policy 
recommendations on how to deal with tacit collusion. This chapter seeks to present these 
scholarly attempts in solving the issue of tacit collusion in oligopolistic markets. 
Scholars have made good attempts to define tacit collusion, and to highlight its 
distinguishing aspects from behavior that may be attributed to mere lawful oligopolistic 
interdependence. However, the author of this thesis does not consider these theories to 
contradict each other, but, on the contrary, considers that scholars have looked at the 
issue from different angles and, therefore, that their theories are mutually supplementary.  
 
          3.1. The debate between Turner and Posner 
       3.1.1. Donald Turner’s approach (1962) 
Professor Turner, reflecting the general approach of the ‘Harvard School,’ believes 
that due to specific conditions, supra-competitive pricing is unavoidable and constitutes 
normal behavior for oligopolistic markets. 194  Professor Turner argues that parallel 
pricing in oligopolistic markets can take place ‘without overt communication or 
agreement,’ but through a ‘rational calculation’ of possible outcomes of the pricing 
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decisions on rivals, how they are likely to react, and what kind of consequences that 
response may bring to each firm’s profitability. Turner contends that blaming firms for 
such ‘conscious parallelism’ is problematic as a traditional ‘meeting of the minds’ 
agreement is hard to establish.195 Therefore, Turner notes that “[a]s a legal conclusion, 
this could be stated in either of two ways: (a) there is no infringement  because there is 
no ‘agreement;’ or (b) there is no infringement although there is ‘agreement,’ but the 
agreement cannot properly be called an unlawful agreement.” 196  Consequently, he 
argues that conscious parallelism in and of itself should not be regarded as cartel conduct 
per se.197 From this premise, Turner indicated that parallel conduct only implies illegal 
behavior if oligopolistic interdependence cannot explain all of the firms ’ conduct.198   
Turner claims that conscious parallelism is devoid of anything that might 
reasonably be called an agreement when it involves simply the independent responses of 
a group of competitors to the same set of economic facts - independent in the sense that 
each firm would have made the same decision for himself even though his rivals decided 
otherwise.199 It is the last part of the sentence which is essential to distinguish between 
behaviors which should be called rational decision-making by an oligopolist. 
Turner maintains that to prohibit oligopolists from taking into consideration 
possible reactions and decisions of rivals is to require them to act in an economically 
irrational manner. Therefore, he concludes that oligopolistic firms that take into account 
the anticipated reactions of rivals in setting their basic prices should not be characterized 
as being in collusion.200  
However, Turner, does recognize that the problem of conscious parallelism must 
be dealt with in some manner. As a remedy, he favors structural solutions. For Turner; 
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oligopolists are only pricing rationally when they take into account the probable 
responses by their competitors, 201so the only effective remedy would be to increase the 
number of competing firms by breaking them up.202 He favors divestiture because it is a 
structural remedy and is thus better suited to the elimination of concentration, a 
structural condition that he believes is a proximate cause of conscious parallelism.  
 
       3.1.2. Richard Posner‘s approach (1969)  
For his part, Professor Posner has proposed a different approach to conscious 
parallelism presenting the views of the ‘Chicago School’ on the oligopoly conundrum. 
Posner challenges the assertion that anti-competitive effects are an unavoidable outcome 
of an oligopolistic market structure, and criticizes Turner’s explanation of parallel 
conduct as unreflective of actual market conditions.203 The essence of Posner’s argument 
is that it is hard to achieve implicit price coordination merely due to the structural 
conditions of the oligopolistic market.204 Moreover, an oligopolistic setting only makes 
this kind of coordination easier – not inevitable.205 In other words, Posner claims that 
conscious parallelism is difficult to achieve without some communication or agreement 
between the firms.206  
Furthermore, in contrast to Turner’s view, Posner refuses to justify parallel pricing 
by ‘oligopolistic interdependence’ as economically rational among oligopolists. He 
claims that it is in fact entirely rational for an oligopolist to refuse to collude and to 
expand output until the return to investors is roughly equal to what they could otherwise 
earn. He further maintains that it is not irrational for such a firm to set a price at 
approximate marginal cost rather than one that is artificially high.  Conversely, Posner 
                                                                 
201 Ibid., 671. 
202 Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 Harvard. 
Law Review 1207, 1230-31 (1969). 
203 Ibid., 55, 69. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid., 66. 
206 Ibid., 60-69. 
70 
 
argues that parallel conduct may be a helpful indicator of a formal yet concealed cartel. 
When the actions of a formal cartel are wholly concealed, however, the parallel behavior 
of the cartel participants is consistent with the high probability of a tacit collusion. 
Therefore, Posner believes that conscious parallelism can be controlled under cartel 
regulation.  
Professor Posner suggests that tacit collusion can be inferred through an 
economic analysis of market conditions and certain behavior on the part of firms.207 He 
claims that the following sorts of conduct can be evidence of the presence of tacit 
collusion: (i) joint systematic price discrimination; (ii) prolonged excess of capacity over 
demand; (iii) relatively low frequency of changes in price; (iv) disproportionate response 
of price to changes in cost; (v) abnormal profits; (vi) price leadership; (vii) the existence 
of fixed market shares;  (viii) identical sealed bids for nonstandard items; (ix) refusal to 
offer discounts in the face of substantial excess capacity; (x) the announcement of price 
increases far in advance without legitimate business justification for so doing; (xi) and 
public statements as to what a seller considers the right price for the industry to 
maintain.208 
Furthermore, Posner expands the scope of the traditional theory by emphasizing 
the use of ‘economic evidence’ (including economic structure, conduct, and 
performance) to infer collusion, rather than the ‘cops and robbers’ method of seeking 
evidence of interfirm communication.209  Thus, he argues that if a particular industry 
demonstrates characteristics that encourage conscious parallelism, and if specific 
economic tests indicate that the market is indeed anti-competitive due to price levels 
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being substantially above a competitive level, then the uniform activity of the 
participants may constitute cartel conduct.210   
 
       3.1.3. Comparative analysis of Turner and Posner’s view 
In this author’s view, the main difference between the approaches of Turner and 
Posner is that Turner considers parallel behavior from the viewpoint of explicit collusion, 
while Posner recognizes that conscious parallelism may amount to tacit collusion.  As 
mentioned in previous parts of this thesis, a subtle difference between tacit and explicit 
collusion is that tacit collusion can occur without direct communication or agreement. 
That is why Turner does not recognize conscious parallelism as a cartel given that no 
direct communication exists among firms. Meanwhile, Posner argues that some 
economic factors can indirectly demonstrate the existence of collusion.  According to 
Turner’s approach, one has to completely exonerate conscious parallelism from cartel 
conduct. According to Posner’s approach, one has to completely prohibit conscious 
parallelism.  
Therefore, in the present author’s view, it is reasonable to strike a balance between 
the two approaches. That is, not all conscious parallel pricing is necessarily justified 
conduct, according to Turner, and not all conscious parallel pricing is necessarily 
constitute cartel, according to Posner.  Therefore, depending on circumstances, parallel 
behavior can be the outcome of tacit collusion as well as lawful oligopolistic 
interdependence. The problem is how to distinguish between the two.  
As discussed in the foregoing, the main feature of tacit collusion is that it may 
occur without direct communication between firms. Therefore, many scholars addressed 
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the issue of facilitating practices, which in many cases help firms coordinate parallel 
pricing without explicitly and directly involving into the agreement. Nonetheless, 
facilitating practices may involve legal conduct and may have pro-competitive as well as 
anti-competitive effects.  
It should be noted that both Posner and Turner agree that the presence of 
facilitating practices may be a good indication of collusion. 211  For instance, if 
oligopolists announce price elevation far in advance of the actual implementation date 
for no reason, it may be suggestive of a firm’s intention to facilitate supra-competitive 
pricing. In such circumstances, both Posner and Turner would apparently find collusion. 
Therefore, scholars mentioned below have strived to answer the question when the use 
of facilitating practice may imply the firm intention to reach tacit collusion.  
 
          3.2. Other scholars’ opinions 
       3.2.1. Michael Blechman  
Professor Blechman argues that the distinction between illegal agreement and 
conscious parallelism is a very real one which can be observed in practice by examining 
the behavior of oligopolists at different times in specific industries. It follows, then, that 
proof of agreement requires that inferences can be drawn from the words and actions of 
firms, where some facilitating practice, such as a public price announcement, might be 
present. That is, public pricing announcements may be used effectively to arrive at anti-
competitive understandings. Every price announcement is a communication which, 
practically, reaches competitors as well as customers. The question is when and whether 
firms use price announcements for pro-competitive reasons or to reach collusion.  
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In resolving this issue, the substance of the pricing information being announced 
is a relevant factor. The release of a current price list may not, by itself, suggest a basis 
for an agreement. However, a statement as to a series or pattern of expected price 
increases, the pre-announcement of a price elevation to occur in the future, or a public 
pledge to cease offering discounts, might, in appropriate circumstances, be construed as  
coordination. A further relevant consideration may be whether the announcement merely 
contains information of commercial necessity, is delivered to customers, or whether it 
goes beyond that in an apparent effort to communicate with competitors. As already 
indicated, however, the ultimate issue of fact in each case is whether the parties intended  
and understood the announcement to be a ‘signal’, that is, an assurance or commitment 
as to future pricing actions. And that is a question that can be fairly answered only in 
light of all of the relevant direct and circumstantial evidence relating to the defendant's 
state of mind.212  
 
       3.2.2. John Lopatka  
Lopatka agrees that the presence of facilitating practices may be good indication of 
collusion. He argues that when courts demand ‘something more’ than just mere parallel 
conduct to infer collusion, they typically search for practices that facilitate coordination 
among firms.213Therefore, practices paradoxically become unlawful when they facilitate 
coordination that has been achieved via mere unilateral pricing decisions. However, 
Lopatka argues that ‘parallel conduct plus facilitating practices’ are insufficient to infer 
collusion but there are three practical issues that courts must overcome to infer collusion: 
namely, a) whether the firms engaged in practices that facilitated interdependent pricing 
by reducing uncertainty; b) whether those practices substantially reduce uncertainty; and 
c) how to distinguish between such ambiguous practices that have the potential both to 
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facilitate interdependent pricing and to increase market efficiency. 214  In this regard, 
Lopatka suggest a behavioral remedy to prohibit practices that facilitate interdependent 
pricing.   
 
       3.2.3. George A. Hay  
Professor Hay argues that the phrase ‘tacit collusion’ has no natural or unique 
meaning. He notes that terms such as ‘meeting of the minds’ and ‘conscious 
commitment to a common scheme’ are less helpful to identify whether a firm is involved 
in tacit collusion, given that a ‘meeting of minds’ can exist to the same extent in case of 
a lawful oligopolistic interdependent situation.  
Hay argues that tacit collusion can be differentiated from pure oligopolistic 
interdependence. The latter exists where the parallel behavior results from the market 
structure, and the firms have not undertaken any steps to eliminate competition among 
themselves. On the other hand, tacit collusion implies that the firms have intentionally 
taken specific actions to eliminate or reduce competition. 215 And those specific actions 
can sufficiently be facilitating practices. Hay reasons that if firms have deliberately 
undertaken one or more facilitating practices with the intention of substantially reducing 
competition among themselves, their conduct constitutes unlawful tacit collusion. If 
facilitating practices have been undertaken for legitimate business purposes, or that the 
practices did not substantially reduce competition among firms, there has been no 
violation. 
Furthermore, Hay insists that telling a court that it may infer tacit collusion from 
circumstantial evidence or even from the presence of certain plus factors is not helpful 
since, unlike inferring a formal agreement from circumstantial evidence, the court has no 
real way of knowing what they are looking for. By default, plus factors become 
violations, not the circumstantial evidence that a vio lation has occurred. If facilitating 
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practices are to be the essence of the violation, the court should consider facilitating 
practices along with violation itself.216  
 
       3.2.4. Thomas Piraino  
Professor Piraino has also attempted to clarify the dividing line between illegal and 
permissible oligopoly conduct without violating US Supreme Court precedent. His 
theory is attractive in its simplicity of proposing a ‘purpose-based’ approach to control 
oligopolistic parallel conduct. 217 He argues that judges are as a matter of course required 
to identify justifications for the behavior of defendants in contract, tort, employment, and 
criminal cases, therefore, there is no reason why they should not be doing this in antitrust 
cases as well. Indeed, a purpose-based inquiry is particularly appropriate in oligopoly 
pricing cases. Piraino argues that game theory can explain how firms can signal by using 
advance price announcements, to communicate with other firms in an oligopolistic 
market, and thus move prices towards supra-competitive levels without attracting much 
attention of enforcement authorities.218 Piraino suggests that courts should question the 
reason for practices like signaling. That is, if legitimate, non-collusive reasons exist for 
practices such as advance public price announcement, the law should not consider 
facilitating practices as violation. In the absence of a legitimate purpose, then the 
facilitating practice should be condemned.219 Piraino argues that such an approach would 
enhance the analytical capacity of the courts by making them focus on the defendant’s 
purpose, which the courts are skillful to find out.220 Thus, Piraino insists that one must 
inquire into the purpose behind the signals and then only prohibit those without a 
legitimate, competitive business purpose. Under such circumstances, the initiating firm's 
action should be construed as an ‘offer’ to participate in a price-fixing cartel, and the 
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conduct of the other firms in response should be deemed constituting ‘acceptance’ of 
that offer.  
He claims that the courts should infer collusion when one or more firms in an 
oligopolistic market signal their intention to initiate a price increase in a manner contrary 
to their individual self- interest, and all firms in the market subsequently accept the  
increase by acting in a manner no less contrary to their own interests. For example, in 
certain industries, such as the airline industry, it is customary for firms to advise 
customers ahead of price changes, so that they can plan their purchases in advance.  By 
contrast, in the case of gas stations, simply posting that it would raise prices by 10% in 
seven days would be contrary to the station’s legitimate independent interests. The 
station would have no reason to notify customers in advance of the planned price 
increase. Automobile drivers need not know price changes in advance, because they 
have no way of storing excess gasoline (or changing their driving habits) in anticipation 
of a price increase. Thus, gasoline service stations have no legitimate independent reason 
for preannouncing price changes. Indeed, preannouncements of price increases are 
contrary to a station’s independent interests, because they may cause consumers to 
immediately begin patronizing other stations. If one gasoline station does preannounce a 
price increase, the announcement will signal to other stations the original station’s 
intention to propose a higher consensus price.   By announcing a price increase in 
advance, the station can signal to its rival a desire for a new consensus price. The other 
station can accept the new consensus price by posting its own an announcement that it, 
too, will be raising prices to the same level in seven days.  
When oligopolists have a legitimate reason to disclose pricing information to 
customers, they often cannot avoid the simultaneous disclosure of the information to 
their rivals. Indeed, when consumers are widely dispersed, as in retail markets, suppliers 
often cannot disclose pricing information other than in a broad public manner. 
Customers also may need advance notice of price changes to plan their purchases.  
Lastly, firms may need to disclose prices to convince their customers that they are not 
charging discriminatorily high prices. Thus competitors will naturally obtain access to 
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such information, and that fact should not make the information disclosure illegal. 
Therefore, the courts may infer tacit collusion when oligopolists publicly disclose 
information that has no value to consumers. 
 
       3.2.5. Matthew Bunda  
Professor Bunda argues firms are creative in masking their illegal conduct to avoid 
liability,221so courts should seriously consider the value of economic evidence in price-
fixing cases222 along with ‘traditional conspiracy’ evidence.  
Furthermore, Bunda disagrees with Piraino’s approach of instructing courts to 
inquire into the purpose behind public price announcement practices and then only 
prohibit those without a legitimate, competitive business purpose. Bunda admits that 
Piraino’s approach is an attractive solution due to its simplicity, but that it is practically 
less valuable because most firms can articulate a reason why a particular pricing 
announcement had a legitimate business purpose similar in the case of conscious 
parallelism. The court is again left to either substitute its own decision for the legitimacy 
of the asserted business reason or determine whether the evidence offered to prove that 
business purpose ‘tends to exclude’ the possibility that the communication was intended 
for legitimate business purposes.223  
Bunda suggests that enforcement authorities may seek to approach such concerns 
from the perspective of merger regulation to stop mergers that are likely to cause high 
levels of concentration in a market. If regulators/the government have reason to believe 
the market is behaving in a suspiciously parallel fashion, and the market is highly 
                                                                 
221  Matthew M. Bunda, Monsanto, Matsushita, and Conscious Parallelism: Towards a Judicial 
Resolution of the Oligopoly Problem, Washington University Law Review 84 (2006): 209. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid., 207. 
78 
 
concentrated, it may seek to prohibit practices possibly facilitating the collusion. If there 
is nothing to ban, firms may seek the termination of the injunction by showing the 
inefficient and burdensome results caused by it. If the practices do facilitate collusion, 
prohibiting such practices will improve market performance.  
 
       3.2.6. Reza Dibadj  
Professor Dibadj argues that the key distinction between unlawful 'tacit collusion' 
and pure interdependent conduct lies in whether a firm is using specific facilitating 
practices that might serve as signals and result in conscious parallelism. 224   Such 
practices are capable as serving as conduits for the exchange of essential business data 
on price, sales volume, and/or cost. An advance public price announcement may serve 
this function. He argues that simultaneous price announcements without legitimate 
business reason for doing that may be probable signs of tacit collusion.  
He suggests that the following analysis of interactions between four variables such 
as price, output, cost, and demand can be helpful in distinguishing mere conscious 
parallelism from tacit collusion. In a competitive marketplace, price and output usually 
rise or fall according to cost and demand. In a collusive marketplace, price rate and 
output vary in methods that are external to cost and demand.225 For instance, collusion is 
likely when prices are increasing even though costs and demand are decreasing. If the 
parallelism is due to actual changes of cost or demand then it points out the competition. 
On the other hand, if parallelism occurs independently of these variables, then it likely 
indicates collusion. In other words, Dibadj argues that if a firm announces a price change 
(increase or decrease) that other firms respond by matching it, then this behavior 
precisely describes tacit collusion. Conversely, there should be no tacit collusion when 
the signal for a price modification originates from outside the market. For example, all 
firms may reduce their prices at the same rate due to a fall in market demand.  
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Thus, Dibadj insists that if price announcements and parallel behavior are driven 
by external factors, such as cost and demand changes, they do not constitute tacit 
collusion. Nonetheless, if price announcement occurs with no legitimate economic 
factors of cost and demand, such conduct is likely to be tacit collusion.  
 
       3.2.7. William Page  
Professor Page proposes that competition authorities ought to search for tacit 
collusion not in the markets in which competing firms coordinate prices with facilitating 
practices, but, rather, in markets in which the evidence suggests that competing firms are 
supplementing facilitating practices with communication. 226  Page claims that tacit 
collusion is less successful without communication, and therefore facilitating practices 
are effective only if they separately come together with private communication. He 
argues that a focus on communication may also help to avoid false negatives.   
In addition, Page insists that collusion without communication is difficult where 
firms are asymmetric in size. In that case, firms at least need to communicate to make 
some agreement about penalties for non-cooperative firms.227  
Furthermore, Page suggests that the more complex the facilitating practice itself, 
the less likely the practice to be sufficient for price coordination without additional 
communications.228 Therefore, investigators should be looking not at the markets most 
conducive to price coordination, but at more complex and more competitively structured 
markets in which firms have nevertheless managed to solve coordination problems with 
facilitating practices.229 
Furthermore, Page refers to Marshall, Marx, and Raiff ’s analysis which finds 
that changes in the frequency, timing, leadership, regularity, effective dates, and success 
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of price increase announcements might be crucial indicators of collusion.230 The analysis 
suggests that, in the absence of collusion, firms never announce price elevation jointly, 
and smaller firms never lead a joint price announcement.  Therefore, Page argues that 
competition authorities should look for changing patterns in the use of facilitating 
practices that probably imply the use of communication to solve coordination problems. 
When price elevation does not result from cost or demand variations, firms have to 
utilize both communication and facilitating practices to solve coordination challenges.  
 
       3.2.8. William Kovacic  
Professor Kovacic suggests that the inference of the existence of a cartel agreement 
can be assessed through the reactions of buyers. He divides markets into two types: 
markets with passive buyers and markets with active buyers.231 Kovacic does not offer a 
specific industry example of the applicability of his theory, therefore it is relevant to any 
industry with powerful buyers. For instance, let us consider the scenario, where 
oligopolistic firms have simultaneously announced a price increase. If buyers are passive 
players in the market, they will accept the announced price as set by firms. On the other 
hand, if the buyers are active players, they will try to lower the price by threatening to 
shift to another seller or use a foreign supplier in case of a price increase. That is, if 
firms want to raise prices, they will undoubtedly face buyer resistance.232 The ability of 
firms to maintain collusive prices through tacit collusion is limited because buyer 
resistance may take advantage of the lack of interfirm communication, monitoring, and 
enforcement and demand for a discount. 233  Therefore, according to Kovacic, if the 
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announced new price keeps unchanged regardless of buyer resistance, it would appear 
that the sellers, i.e., the firms in an oligopolistic market, must be communicating beyond 
the mere presence of a public price announcement, since without collusive 
communication sellers would fail to increase their prices.  
 
       3.2.9. Louis Kaplow  
Professor Kaplow refers to tacit collusion as successful oligopolistic coordination. 
He argues that tacit collusion may be shown by market-based evidence such as pricing 
patterns, symptoms of price elevation, and facilitating practices. It should be noted here 
that Kaplow considers facilitating practices as the ‘tail’, not the ‘dog’.234 
He argues that a facilitating device can serve as interfirm communication and 
therefore its presence may support an inference of oligopolistic collusive pricing. These 
might include advance public price announcements, predictions about market demand or 
costs, and open discussions of various matters at trade association meetings. These 
public announcements could be quite detailed, describing price moves, dates, or they 
may be vague, such as a statement that the firm believes that demand has fallen or 
raised.235 Such public announcements are likely to be interpreted as an invitation rather 
than a unilateral action. 
However, unlike Page’s theory (discussed previously), Kaplow argues that 
communication should not be necessary to establish a violation. Indeed, Kaplow argues 
that requiring specific forms of communication to prove collusion simply confuses 
courts, introducing incoherencies, and may exempt inefficient tacit price coordination 
harmful to social welfare. Kaplow suggests prohibiting competing firms from reaching 
non-competitive outcomes by interdependent conduct, regardless of whether there has 
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been communication between them in doing so. 236   Thus, Kaplow recognizes that 
communication can be useful for firms to reach an agreement, but argues that it should 
not be part of the legal definition of agreement. 
In addition, Kaplow emphasizes that interdependence does not simply mean that 
rivals are mutually aware of one another’s actions. He properly criticizes the common 
equation of interdependence with ‘conscious parallelism’, which can mean a simple 
awareness of others’ parallel actions with common external cause – similarly to how 
pedestrians simultaneously open umbrellas on the same street when the rain begins to 
fall without the need or presence of any previous communication or collusion between 
them. Even a competitive firm that raised its prices in response to an increase in the cost 
of inputs would probably be aware when its rivals also increase prices. In this case, 
however, the competitive firm takes other firms’ behavior as given in choosing its price. 
A firm acts independently, even if it takes account of its rivals’ actions as long as rivals’ 
actions are determined by other external forces. It acts interdependently only if rivals 
engage in the strategic estimation of each other’s choices among a range of possible 
equilibria in the present and later periods. Therefore, Kaplow claims that the focus of the 
analysis of price-fixing should be on whether oligopolists set non-competitive prices 
interdependently in an economic sense. 237  That is if parallel pricing causes supra-
competitive pricing in a market, which should be indication of tacit collusion. 
Lastly, Professor Kaplow also recognizes that parallel behavior initiated by a 
dominant firm is independent. 238 He claims that it is normal when smaller firms follow a 
powerful dominant firm in setting their output at the point at which their marginal cost 
equals the dominant firm’s price. Therefore, Kaplow argues that condemning dominant 
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firm pricing as a cartel would be as problematic in the manner that it would also be 
problematic in condemning simple monopoly pricing.  
 
 
          3.3. Conclusion 
Oligopolistic conscious parallelism without direct communication constitutes a 
significant challenge within competition law. Legal scholars have proposed various 
conceptual definitions of tacit collusion to solve this oligopolistic problem. Concluding 
from scholarly theories reviewed in the foregoing, the author of this thesis suggests the 
following definition for conscious parallelism and tacit collusion: 
Conscious parallelism relates to pure oligopolistic interdependent conduct, where 
firms take no additional steps or actions to communicate or reduce market uncertainty, 
and act based on mere consideration or calculation of the possible reactions of other 
firms. 
Tacit collusion implies that firms take additional steps or use specific actions to 
eliminate or reduce market uncertainty in order to achieve price coordination. Such 
additional actions are not necessarily unlawful, but their misuse may also be considered 
to amount to tacit collusion.  
 At this point, it would be useful to present a summary of the most significant 
scholarly proposals concerning the issue of identification of tacit collusion via 
facilitating practices. According to the scholars under review, the practice of public price 
announcements may prove the presence of tacit collusion if: 
a) it is used as a signal or invitation to collude; 
b) it takes place far in advance without legitimate business justification; 
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c) it contains more information than is actually necessary for customers to know 
or is actually of no value to consumers; 
d) the making of advance price announcements is not customary for firms;   
e) price announcements occur with no legitimate economic factors of cost and 
demand; 
f) there are changes in the frequency, timing, leadership, regularity, effective 
dates of public announcements; 
g) a public price announcement and parallel conduct result in supra-competitive 
prices; 
h) a price initiator is not a dominant firm with a high market share, which could 
enable it to unilaterally raise prices without risk of losing customers.  
Thus, if the conduct goes beyond signaling, where there is both an invitation to 
collude and acceptance, then it will constitute tacit collusion.  This approach should 
deter competitors from signaling with illegitimate intent. A signal can suggest to an 
antitrust agency that an unlawful conspiracy has taken place, thus drawing an 
investigation.  
As for remedies, scholars differ in opinion. For instance, Turner favors structural 
remedies,239 whereas Lopatka and Bunda prefer behavioral remedies240 and call for the 
prohibition of practices that facilitate interdependent pricing.   
                                                                 
239 A structural remedy is defined as a measure that effectively changes the structure of the firm by 
a transfer of property rights regarding tangible or intangible assets, including the transfer of an 
entire business unit that does not lead to any ongoing relationships between the former and the 
future owner. 
240 A behavioral remedy does not eliminate the incentive of the regulated firm to restrict 
competition and regulate behaviors; such remedies are intended to control the ability of firms to 
restrict competition.  The OECD Council Recommendation on Structural Separation in Regulated 
Industries. https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/OECD-Recommendation-on-Structural-
separation-regulated-industries.pdf 
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Obviously, the prohibition of the practice of public announcements can be 
helpful in reducing collusive attempts of price coordination, but courts and 
enforcement agencies have recognized that firms may have legitimate reasons to 
ensure their investors, customers, and suppliers are informed. Therefore, the absolute 
prohibition of public price announcements may actually harm business relations and 
therefore fail to be a rational solution for the prevention of tacit collusion. On the other 
hand, a complicated rule of reason approach in assessing the legitimacy of facilitating 
practices may, moreover, increase the cost and burden on regulators. Thus, it is 
preferable to consider alternatives to behavioral remedies as ex-ante preventive tools. 
In this regard, the Japanese reporting system discussed in the following chapter may be 
instructive.   
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Chapter 4.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FORMER JAPANESE 
PARALLEL PRICE INCREASE REPORTING SYSTEM  
          4.1. Background 
Japan has recognized the necessity to address the problem of oligopolistic pricing 
since the 1970s due to the ‘Nixon shocks’, the Oil Crisis, and the generally poor 
economic situation as large companies in that period frequently formed many hidden 
cartels.  Along with strengthening the JAMA in 1977, Japan introduced a unique 
‘parallel price increase reporting system’ 241  to tackle tacit collusion. However, after 
functioning almost for 30 years the reporting system was abolished in 2005. The 
reporting system serves as a good paradigm for developing countries to learn about the 
Japanese experience in the regulation of oligopolistic parallel pricing.  
By publicizing the reasons for such parallel price elevations, the reporting system 
was designed to prevent the abuse of power by oligopolistic firms. In the 1970s, there 
were many cases of parallel price elevations in oligopolistic markets. Oligopolistic 
parallel pricing in that period has demonstrated the limitations of the JAMA to regulate 
such market behavior. Even with the mitigating standards for proving cartel conduct 
and enhancing structural regulations, there were still legal loopholes through which 
collusion managed to occur. To prevent such collusion, Article 18-2242 was specifically 
incorporated by the 1977 amendments of the JAMA.  
                                                                 
241The parallel price increase reporting system was pursuant to Article 18 (2) JAMA, which has since 
been abolished.  
242 The text is as follows: ‘Article 18-2 [Reporting requirement on parallel price increases]  
(1) If, in any particular field of business where the total value of goods (this term refers to the value 
of the goods concerned less the amount equivalent to the amount of taxes levied directly on such 
goods) of the same description supplied in Japan (excluding those exported; hereinafter the same in 
this section) or the total value of services (this refers to the price of the services concerned less an 
amount equivalent to the amount of tax levied on the recipients of such services with respect 
thereto) of the same description supplied in Japan during a one-year period designated by a Cabinet 
87 
 
In the original draft of the provisions related to the reporting system, the JFTC 
requested that firms should also disclose their cost and price information because 
oligopolistic interdependence tends to cause simultaneous price elevation in the market. 
There was an opinion that in a highly oligopolistic market requesting firms to disclose 
cost and price information may inhibit price elevation by firms due to social pressure 
and observation, which ultimately might lead to the promotion of competition.243 
 However, the business community opposed the draft, cla iming that disclosing the 
cost and price information would conversely eliminate competition among firms and 
also deny freedom of pricing. In addition, to examine whether the price set by firms 
was appropriate or not was the job of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC). As 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Ordinance, is in excess of 60 billion yen, the ratio of the total amount of such goods or services 
supplied by the three entrepreneurs, which rank among the three largest entrepreneurs in Japan in 
terms of volume of supply (this refers to the quantity of goods or services of the same description 
which one entrepreneur supplied during a given one-year period, and in case it is not appropriate to 
be calculated by the quantity, the quantity shall be represented in terms of the value; hereinafter the 
same meaning in this section) to the aggregate volume of such goods or services of the same 
description supplied in Japan during such one-year period (hereinafter referred to as "aggregate 
volume") exceeds seven tenths, and if two or more major entrepreneurs (including the largest one) 
this term means the five entrepreneurs each of which account for one twentieth or more of the 
aggregate volume and rank among the five largest entrepreneurs in Japan; hereinafter the same 
meaning in this section) raise the price they use as the basis of their transactions in such goods or 
services of the same description by an identical or similar amount or percentage within a period of 
three months, the Fair Trade Commission may ask such major entrepreneurs for a report furnishing 
a statement of reasons for such a raise in the price of goods or services: Provided, this all not apply 
to price increases effected by entrepreneurs whose price of goods services authorized or approved 
by, or filed with the competent minister in charge of the business in which the said entrepreneurs are 
engaged (in case such price shall be filed with the competent minister, this shall apply only to such 
case where the competent minister has the authority to order a change in such price).  
(2) In event any change has occurred in the economic conditions resulting in a change in domestic 
industrial shipments and wholesale prices, the amount of prices as prescribed in the preceding 
subsection may be revised by virtue Cabinet Ordinance to reflect such change’.  
243  OECD Competition Committee meeting, June 15, 2015. Hearing on Approaches to issues in 
Oligopoly markets (Contributions from Japan). 
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a result, it was agreed that only the reporting of the reasons for price elevation should 
be submitted.244 
 
       4.1.1. Requirements for a report on parallel price increases 
It should be noted that not all parallel pricing patterns were subject to reporting. 
The following conditions must be satisfied to request firms to report the reasons for the 
price increase: 
a) the total sale of products or services supplies in Japan must exceed 60 billion 
yen per year;  
b) the market must be a highly oligopolistic market;  
c) the price increased must be the standard price in the business;  
d) the increase in prices must be parallel (for instance, two or more leading 
enterprises, including the top ranking enterprise, in an oligopolistic market, 
must have raised the prices of their products by the same or a similar amount 
or rate within three months);  
e) those parties who must report parallel price increases are leading 
entrepreneurs.  
The contents of the report would include information which rationally explained 
the reason for the price elevation. Moreover, the reporting system was not applicable to 
all markets; the JFTC would specify the items that fell under the system every fiscal 
year. For instance, 87 goods and service markets fell within the ambit of Article 18 (2) 
(1) JAMA in 2004. 245  
The JFTC would gather reports and then send them as the Annual Report to the 
National Diet (i.e., Japan’s bicameral legislature), which would publish a White Paper 
                                                                 
244 OECD Competition Committee meeting, June 15, 2015. Hearing on Approaches to issues in 
Oligopoly markets (Contributions from Japan).  
245 JFTC, (1977) as amended December 17, 2004, Appendix 1. 
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open to the public. In addition to the annual report of the JFTC to the Diet, the JFTC 
could also make public any such matters it thought necessary to ensure the proper 
enforcement of the JAMA, with the exception of confidential trade secrets of firms 
(Article 43 and Article 44-2).246 By publishing the reasons given by firms for price 
elevation, the JFTC would thus expose firms to social oversight and criticism, and 
would hope to encourage self-restraint concerning irrational parallel price increase. 
Nonetheless, it seems that the reporting system had failed to meet the JFTC’s original 
expectations, which resulted in its subsequent abolition.   
 
       4.1.2. Abolition of the reporting system 
The reporting requirement was abolished in 2005. Overall, there had been 75 
cases during the operation of the reporting system (1978-2005). The reasons for the 
price elevations provided by firms mainly concerned increases in the cost of raw 
materials, manufacturing, advertising, and transportation.  
Figure 1. The dynamics of the number of reports for parallel price increase FY 
1978-2004 
2
5
20
1
8
3 2 3 1 0 1 1
2
10
7
3 2
0 0
2
0 0 1 0 0 1 00
5
10
15
20
25
Number of reports
 
                                                                 
246 http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/05/jicatext/aug31.pdf 
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Source: Amendment to Anti-monopoly Act in 2005247 
 
The reporting system was often criticized for providing limited regulation and for 
merely appearing to justify collective price increases by firms.  For instance, the JFTC 
solely asked for the economic reasons of the price elevation without examining how 
firms could come to such joint action.  Moreover, the JFCT would not force firms to 
return to the previous price points when the reasons reported by firms seemed 
unconvincing. A further criticism of the reporting system is that its main drawback was 
the late timing of the report justifying the price increase, so it did not have much impact 
on the firm’s behavior. 248  It has long been suggested that due to the changes in 
corporate awareness that parallel price increases were permissible conduct if no prior 
collusion existed firms got used to the reporting requirements. 249 That factor ultimately 
made the reporting system lose its effect, particularly since even if tacit collusion was 
detected, it could not be punished in time or adequately.  
At the time of the abolition of the reporting system, the JFTC provided the 
following reasons for its decision. The report targeted the parallel price increase at the 
national market level, however, actual price increases were often implemented at the 
regional level.250 The reporting system had created an administrative burden upon firms 
and had increased the administrative cost of regulators in relation to the costs of 
investigations.251 As a result, the 2005 amendment to the JAMA scrapped the reporting 
                                                                 
247諏訪園 貞明編『平成 17年改正独占禁止法―新しい課徴金制度と審判・犯則調査制度の
逐条解説』（商事法務，2005年）228頁。 
248平林英勝『独占禁止法の歴史（上）』（信山社、2012年） (History of the Antimonopoly 
act, 2012)。 
249 諏訪園 貞明編 『平成 17年改正独占禁止法―新しい課徴金制度と審判・犯則調査制度の
逐条解説 』（商事法務、2005年）194頁。 
250 「価格の同調的引上げに対する報告徴収規定の廃止に伴う所要の措置について」（公正
取引委員会、平成１７年５月１７日）。 
251 諏訪園 貞明 編『平成 17年改正独占禁止法―新しい課徴金制度と審判・犯則調査制度の
逐条解説』（商事法務、2005年）194頁。 
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requirement. 252 Another reason for this was the strengthening of the investigative 
powers of the JFTC, and the introduction of a leniency program in 2005 that improves 
the chances of direct evidence of parallel price elevations due to cartel behavior.253  
This Chapter examines both types of scenarios where public announcement are 
present or absent. By comparing both scenarios, this chapter draws conclusions on how 
parallel price elevation works.  As for the case study, the present author has selected 
some cases on price elevation reported by firms to the JFTC under the Reporting 
system between 1990 and 2003.  
          4.2. Identification of tacit collusion via reporting system analysis  
Invariably, any parallel price increase in oligopolistic markets is likely to take 
place either in connection to, or in the absence of, a public price announcement.  
Advance public price announcements take place when one or more firms disclose 
information publicly to producers, suppliers, and consumers about their future 
intentions on price changes. Firms may announce price changes in the public domain by 
a variety of means and methods, including e-mail, television, the radio, or the press, 
their website, in a press release, while attending a press conference, and the 
announcement of future plans in an e-mail. Public price announcements are considered 
to have mixed effects. On the other hand, they may be beneficial for customers, 
competitors, and the competitive process. In some markets, public price announcements 
are considered a standard feature, such as in the market for construction materials. It is 
possible, due to the specific market structure to find advance announcements necessary 
for the buyers to be able to inform its downstream market about coming changes. On 
the other hand, public price announcements may reduce the strategic uncertainty on the 
market and create a focal point for coordination and thus have anti-competitive effects. 
Public price announcements make it possible for firms to ‘check or test the market’ to 
                                                                 
252 Stefan Weishaar, Law and Economics Analysis of the Current Japanese Antimonopoly 
Legislation (2005):6. Available at: http://aslea.org/paper/Weishaar2.pdf 
253 JFTC, Report of the Study Group on the Antimonopoly Act, (October 28, 2003). Available at: 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly_2003/oct/2003_oct_28_0.files/2003-Oct-28_0.pdf 
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coordinate price elevation. The first company to announce its price intentions may want 
to see if the competitors show any support or indications to follow the plan set out in 
their announcement. If none of the competing firms follows the announced price, the 
initiating firm can cancel or postpone the price implementation without any risk of 
losing market shares or customers. If a sufficient number of rivals have agreed with the 
announced price, it makes it possible for rivals to coordinate their prices. In other words, 
firms can use their announcements as communication devices to coordinate their price 
behavior. When parallel price elevation occurs without any advance public price 
announcements by firms, the possibility of the existence of advance collusive 
communication is high unless it has resulted from a common external cause.  
There may be two collusive scenarios in public announcement practice. First, 
when a public price announcement is driven by collusion in advance. A good indication 
can be price announcements of firms without pre-notification of buyers. Second, when 
advance public price announcements are used as a ‘signal’ or an ‘invitation to collude.’ 
In such case, one leading firm may notify or agree on a new price with buyers in 
advance, and then make a public announcement to encourage other firms in favor of a 
price elevation. However, exactly when price announcements lead to collusion cannot 
be easily established.  
Following the review of scholarly opinion in Chapter 3, it is this author’s view 
that the careful consideration of these factors can be helpful in identifying tacit 
collusion among firms or, at least, for alerting enforcement authorities to circumstances 
in which it may be prudent to intervene.  
A list of cases of parallel pricing collected in the reporting system of Japan that 
are helpful in identifying tacit collusion or circumstances meriting investigation has 
been involved below.  Due to the fact that the JFTC’s annual reports including parallel 
price increase reports are publicly available only from FY1989 to FY 2004, the selected 
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cases relate to that period.  Among them, the author has chosen the most relevant and 
useful cases for the case study.  
 
          4.3. Case study 
       4.3.1. Public announcement scheme  
 
Case 1. Cast iron pipe market254 
 
Public 
announcement 
date  
Date of 
notifying 
buyers 
Planned date 
of the price 
increase 
Implementatio
n date 
Price 
increase 
rate (%) 
Kubota 1990/11/28 1990/10/05 1991/04/01 1991/04/01 8.2 
Kurimoto 1990/12/25 
After 
1991/01 
1991/01/05 1991/04/03 8.5 
Nippon 
Steel Pipe 
- 
End of 
1991/01 
1991/04/01 1991/04/19 8.4 
 
Market condition: The total market share of the top three companies in the iron 
pipe market is 81.8%. Kubota is a leading company in the market.  
Reason for price increase indicated by companies: In general, all companies 
have indicated almost similar reasons for the price increase, which is due to the 
increase of costs concerning raw materials, labor, manufacturing, selling and general 
administration.   
Kubota’s reason: The total cost for 1991 might rise by 10.6% per ton in 
comparison to the 1987 fiscal year. 
Kurimoto’s reason:  The total cost for 1990 (January-September) rose by 6.8 % 
per ton in comparison with the 1986 fiscal year. 
                                                                 
254 JFTC Annual report for FY 1991. 
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Nippon Steel pipe’s reason:  The total cost for 1991 would rise by 11.3 % per ton 
in comparison with the 1989 fiscal year.  
Analysis of the case:  In this case, an initiator of the price increase was Kubota. 
Then, a month later following Kubota, Kurimoto made a public statement on price 
elevation. However, Nippon Steel Pipe did not make any price announcements and 
directly notified its buyers.  It is unclear why Nippon Steel Pipe Company did not 
make an advance public price announcement along with rivals, but it may be that it is 
not customary for Nippon Steel pipe to make a public announcement in advance.   
As the table shows, before making public statements on price elevation Kubota, 
has already negotiated its new price with buyers sending them a notification. 
Meanwhile, Kurimoto has notified buyers only after publicly announcing its price 
increase. It is not insignificant that Kubota made a public price announcement after 
individually notifying its buyers concerning price changes. Usually, firms make public 
price announcements to inform buyers of forthcoming price changes. If Kubota has 
already informed its buyers privately, it is difficult to see a legitimate business reason 
for making a public announcement then. Therefore, it is possible that Kubota had used 
the public announcement as a ‘signal’ or an ‘invitation to collude.’  Next, the change 
of planned date by Kurimoto to align it with rivals may imply that some sort of 
interfirm communication had occurred among firms. Furthermore, public 
announcements had been made far in advance of the implementation date – namely, 
five months ahead, a fact that supports the inference of tacit collusion in the absence of 
any legitimate economic reason.  Lastly, in order to justify a price increase rate of 8.3 
percent on average, each firm takes figures from previous years in the past; probably 
they were the less profitable years for each firm. In this author’s opinion, as the price 
increase began in 1991, it would be reasonable to compare prices with 1990.  
Therefore, the enforcement authority would need to check factors of cost and demand 
to identify whether the price elevation rate is supra-competitive. Thus, this case of 
price elevation is suspicious and justifies further investigation for tacit collusion. To be 
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sure, it is necessary to check the content of a price announcement statement for 
whether it contains more information than what would reasonably be expected for 
buyers to need.  
 
Case 2. Fish meat ham/sausage  in 1990255 
 
Public 
announcement 
date 
Date of 
notifying 
buyers 
Planned 
date of the 
price 
increase 
Implementation 
date 
Price increase 
rate (%) 
Taiyo 1990/07/27 1990/08/01 1990/09/01 1990/09/01 11.6 
Marudai - 1990/08/17 1990/09/01 1990/09/01 11.3 
Nissuicon 1990/07/03 1990/07/02 1990/08/01 1990/08/01 9.9 
Toyo - 1990/09/11 1990/10/01 1990/10/01 11.8 
Maruzen - 1990/09/17 1990/10/21 1990/10/21 12.6 
 
Fish 
meat 
ham/sau
sage in 
1991 
Public 
announcement 
date 
Date of 
notifying 
buyers 
Planned date 
of the price 
increase 
Implementation 
date 
Price 
increase 
rate (%) 
Taiyo - 1991/09/20 1991/10/21 1991/10/21 14.3 
Marudai 1991/08/23 1991/08/05 1991/09/02 1991/09/02 16.5 
Nissuicon - 1991/07/05 1991/09/01 1991/09/01 14.6 
Toyo - 1991/10/10 1991/11/01 1991/11/01 16.7 
Maruzen - 1991/11/26 1991/12/01 1991/12/01 12.7 
                                                                 
255JFTC Annual report for 1990. 
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Market condition: Top three companies Taiyo, Marudai, and Nissuicon have a 
market share of 70.4% in total. The leading company in a market is Taiyo.  
A common reason for price elevation (1991): Price increase for main 
ingredients. 
Taiyo: As the purchase price of the main ingredients (surimi) rises, the 
manufacturing cost rose by 17.5% per kg. 
Marudai: As the purchase price of the main ingredients (surimi) rises, the 
manufacturing cost will rise by 31.4% per kg. 
Nissuicon: As the purchase price of the main ingredients (surimi) rises, the 
manufacturing cost rises by 11.3% per kg. 
Toyo: As the purchase price and the labor cost of the main ingredients (surimi) 
increase, the manufacturing cost rises by 19.8% per kg, 
Maruzen: As the purchase price, labor costs and overhead expenses of raw 
materials (surimi, starch) increase, the manufacturing cost rises by 17.5% per kg.  
Analysis of the case: First, it becomes quite understandable from the table that 
the public announcement practice is not customary for the firms, as those firms who 
made public announcements in 1990 did not make it in 1991 and vice versa. Therefore, 
it is highly probable that the public announcement has been used as ‘signaling’ in 1990.  
 
Case 3. Automotive tire/tube market256 
 
Public 
announcement 
date 
Day of 
notifying 
buyers 
Planned 
date of the 
price 
increase 
Implementation 
date 
Price 
increase 
rate (%) 
                                                                 
256 JFTC Annual report for 1991. 
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Bridgestone 1991/01/28 1991/01/28 1991/02/21 1991/02/21 4.6 
Yokohama 
Rubber 
1991/01/10 1991/01/11 1991/02/01 1991/02/01 4.8 
Sumitomo 
Rubber 
1990/12/27 1990/12/27 1991/02/01 1991/02/01 5.3 
Toyo 
Rubber 
1991/01/16 1991/01/14 1991/02/12 1991/02/12 5.6 
 
Market condition: The total market share of the top three companies is 75.3%. 
A leading company is Bridgestone. Toyo Rubber has more than 5% of market share.  
Reason for the price increase: All four companies have indicated the same 
reasons for price elevation – namely, increase in costs for raw material (synthetic 
rubber, carbon black), fuel, and logistics. In particular, 
Bridgestone: Without the price increase, the total cost of the automotive tire and 
tube for the first half of 1991 (January-June) is expected to rise by 5.2% per ton in 
comparison with the first half of 1990 (January-June).  
Yokohama Rubber: Without the price increase, the total cost of the automotive 
tire and tube for 1991 (January- December) is expected to rise by 6.0% per ton in 
comparison with 1990 (January- December). 
Sumitomo Rubber: Without the price increase, the total cost of the automotive 
tire and tube for the fiscal year of 1991 is expected to rise by 7.3% per ton in 
comparison with the fiscal year of 1989. 
Toyo Rubber: Without the price increase, the total cost of the automotive tire and 
tube for the fiscal year of 1991 is expected to rise by 8.0% per ton in comparison with 
the fiscal year of 1989.   
Analysis of the case: In this case, all firms had made public announcements. 
The time gap between public announcements and implementation dates is short.  In 
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contrast to all three leading firms, only Toyo notified its customers before making a 
public announcement. The price increase rate of each firm appropriately reflects the 
cost rate indicated in the reasoning of each firm. These factors probably demonstrate 
that these firms have been acting under mere oligopolistic interdependence and no 
tacit collusion is borne by these facts alone.  
 
Case 4. Bus / Truck Chassis market257 
 
Public 
announcement 
date 
Date of 
notifying 
buyers 
Implementation 
date 
Price increase 
rate (%) 
Mitsubishi 1991/09/27 1991/09/27 1991/12/01 4.5 
Hino 1991/10/02 1991/10/02 1991/11/01 4.9 
Isuzu 1991/10/11 1991/10/11 1991/11/01 4.7 
Nissan 1991/10/07 1991/10/08 1991/12/20 4.8 
 
Market conditions: Three top companies Mitsubishi, Hino, and Isuzu have 
87.2% of the market share in total. The leading company in the market is Mitsubishi.  
Common reasons for price elevation: cost increase concerning raw materials 
(functional parts, cast parts.), outsourcing processing, physical distribution, labor, test 
research corresponding to emission control regulations, capital investment depreciation 
etc.  
Analysis of the case: The fact that all firms made public announcements prior to 
the notification of buyers may imply that it was used to mitigate buyer resistance. 
Furthermore, the public announcements were made far in advance of the 
implementation date thus making suspicion of tacit collusion justified.   
                                                                 
257 JFTC Annual report for FY 1991. 
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Case 5. Ventilator market258 
 
Public 
announcement 
date 
Date of 
notifying 
buyers 
Planned 
date of the 
price 
increase 
Implementation 
date 
Price 
increase 
rate (%) 
Matsushita 
Seiko 
1992/05/21 1992/02/18 1992/05/21 1992/08/01 8.6 
Toshiba 1992/04/01 1992/03/19 1992/07/01 1992/10/01 8.0 
Mitsubishi 
Electric 
- 1992/07/24 1992/10/01 1992/10/01 7.3 
 
Market condition: The total market share of the top three companies is 88.1%. 
Major companies in the market are Mitsubishi Electric, Matsushita Seiko, Toshiba, and 
Seibu Electric. The leading company is Mitsubishi Electric. 
Reasons for the price increase: All firms have common reasons, namely, the rise 
in costs for materials, logistics, and labor. 
Analysis of the case: In this case, both, Matsushita Seiko and Toshiba negotiated 
with buyers before making public announcements. However, Mitsubishi Electric did not 
make a public announcement.  Price announcements were made far in advance of the 
implementation date, namely, 3 to 6 months in advance. The fact that all firms changed 
their initial implementation dates is also suspicious.  Therefore, there is good ground for 
intervention on the part of enforcers.  
 
Case 6. Beer 
                                                                 
258 JFTC Annual report for FY 1993. 
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Date of Public 
announcement/ notifying 
buyers 
Implementation date 
Kirin 1994/04/12 1994/05/01 
Asahi 1994/04/18 1994/05/01 
Sapporo 1994/04/19 1994/05/01 
Suntory 1994/04/19 1994/05/01 
 
 New price Increase amount Increased rate 
Large size bottle  
(633 ml) 
330 yen 10 yen 3.1% 
Medium size bottle 
(500 ml) 
280 yen 5 yen 1.8% 
Small size bottle 
 (334 ml) 
200 yen 5 yen 2.6% 
Can (500 ml) 295 yen 10 yen 3.5% 
Can (350 ml) 225 yen 5 yen 2.3% 
 
Market condition: The total market share of the top three companies is 89.6%. 
The leading company is Kirin. 
Reasons for the price increase: Since 1 May 1994, the liquor tax on beer has 
risen to 14,008 yen (including consumption tax) per kilogram. 
Analysis of the case: Although the public announcement dates, the 
implementation dates, and the price increase rates are identical, firms have a legitimate 
reason for this coincidence. An external factor such as a tax increase on beer products 
led all firms to react similarly by elevating their prices. There is almost no time gap 
between their public price announcements and implementation dates. Price rate 
similarity may be explained by price leadership theory, where in this case a leading firm 
Kirin had announced first and then other firms followed its price increase rate. Due to 
the obvious external economic factor, each are likely to have made the same decision for 
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itself even if its competitors may have decided otherwise, which would imply that no 
tacit collusion necessarily took place. 
 
 
Case 7. Instant coffee market 
 
Public 
announcement 
date 
Date of 
notifying 
buyers 
Implementation 
date 
Price increase rate 
Manufacturers’ 
price 
Retailers’ 
price 
Nestle 
Japan 
1994/12/05 1994/12/05 1995/01/01 12.89 % 13.11 % 
AGF 1994/12/09 1994/12/09 1995/01/01 12.90 % 13.12 % 
 
Market condition: The total market share of just two companies is 84.6%. The 
leading company is Nestlé Japan followed by AGF.  
A common reason for the price increase: The price of raw coffee beans had 
increased due to frost damage and drought in Brazil during June and July 1994. 
Analysis of the case: The facts are similar to the Beer case discussed above. Due 
to force majeure circumstances that had caused a price increase for coffee beans, both 
companies had to react by elevating their prices accordingly.   
 
       4.3.2. Non-announcement parallel pricing scheme 
Parallel pricing in an oligopolistic market may also happen without advance 
public price announcements on the part of firms. In that case, due to the absence of 
public price announcements, firms face many difficulties in achieving price 
coordination given that market uncertainty is higher.  Therefore, when parallel pricing 
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occurs in an oligopolistic market, it is a strong indicator for enforcement authorities of 
the possibility of tacit collusion in the market.  
 
 
Case 8. Glass bulb for cathode ray tube  
 
Date of 
notifying 
buyers 
Planned date 
of the price 
increase 
Implementation 
date 
Price 
increase rate 
(%) 
Nippon Electric 
Glass 
1990/09/28 1990/10/01 1991/04/01 5.4 
Asahi Glass 1990/10/01 1990/10/01 
1991/04/01 (partly 
on March 21) 
5.0 
 
Market condition: The total market share of the two companies is 99.4%. The 
leading company is Nippon Electric Glass.   
A common reason for the price increase: Due to the rise of the cost of raw 
material (litharge, strontium carbonate), fuel, and logistics. 
Analysis of the case: First, it is a highly concentrated duopoly market that 
facilitates collusion. Second, both firms almost simultaneously notified buyers on the 
price increase. Also, the initially planned dates, the actual implementation dates, and 
the price increase rates are identical. It is evident from the above table that the 
desirable (i.e., planned) date of the price increase had changed from October to April, 
which may imply the presence of some inter-firm communication.  
 
 
 
Case 9. Shine glass market in 1994259 
 
                                                                 
259 JFTC Annual Report for FY 1994. 
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Date of 
negotiation with 
buyers 
The planned 
day of price 
increase 
Implementation 
date 
Price increase 
rate (%) 
Asahi Glass May 1994 1994/07/01 1994/06/10 6.6 
Nippon Sheet 
Glass 
 August 1994 1994/10/01 1994/09/01 4.5 
Central Glass July 1994 1994/08/01 1994/08/01 4.8 
 
Market condition: The total share of the top three companies is 98.6%. The 
leading company is Asahi Glass. 
Reason for the price increase:  
Asahi Glass: As the selling price had declined in FY 1994, it could not fully 
absorb the decrease in selling price. 
Nippon Sheet Glass: Overall operating loss in FY 1993 was about 3.2 billion 
yen. The price increase rate was been set by taking into consideration the price 
increase situation of the leading company Asahi Glass. 
Central Glass: The loss of the company for FY 1993 was 1.2 billion yen.  
Analysis of the case: The case is non-collusive. First, the negotiation dates of 
firms with their respective buyers differ by 3 to 4 months. Also, there are similar time 
lapses with regard to the implementation dates: Asahi Glass implemented its price on 
10 June 1994, while Nippon Sheet Glass and Central Glass in August and September 
of that year. Furthermore, Nippon Sheet Glass and Central Glass started negotiating 
their price elevation only after Asahi Glass had practically implemented its price. This 
implies that Nippon Sheet Glass and Central Glass had become aware of Asahi’s 
intentions to raise prices not earlier than its implementation date. In other words, no 
communication took place among the firms, but the firms at least acted 
interdependently. Also, the fact that the price increase rate of the leading company 
Asahi Glass is much higher than the other two companies, which also weakens 
assumptions of tacit collusion.   
 
104 
 
 
 
 
Case 10. Shine glass market in 1999260 
 
 
Date of 
negotiation with 
buyers 
Planned date of 
the price 
increase 
Implementation 
date 
Price increase 
rate (%) 
Asahi Glass 1999/10/07 1999/11/01 1999/11/01 13.22 
Nippon Sheet 
Glass 
1999/10/29 1999/12/01 1999/12/01 14.38 
Central Glass November 1999 1999/12/20 1999/12/20 14.46 
 
Market condition: The total share of the top three companies is 92.7%. The 
leading company is Asahi Glass. 
Reason for a price increase:  
Asahi Glass: The revenue from plate glass had deteriorated, and the cost of oil 
as the main input fuel has increased since the Spring of 1999. 
Nippon Sheet Glass: The revenue of the flat glass business is low due to a 
significant decline in selling prices. The price increase rate had been set by taking into 
consideration the price increase situation of the leading company, Asahi Glass. 
Central Glass: Due to a drop in revenue.  The price increase rate had been set 
by taking into consideration the price increase of its rivals.  
Analysis of the case: In this case, firms did not cite common reasons for price 
elevation. In the absence of public announcements, Asahi and Nippon Sheet Glass 
started negotiating their price elevation almost at the same time (namely, within a 
month). Although the firms had different implementation dates, the price increase rate 
was not much different between them. Central Glass started negotiating the price 
increase only after Asahi Glass has already implemented its price increase, which 
                                                                 
260 JFTC Annual Report for FY 2000. 
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means Central Glass became aware of Asahi’s intention to raise the price on 1 
November and only then initiated negotiations with buyers. A suspicious fact 
concerns how Nippon Sheet Glass was aware of Asahi’s intentions on price 
negotiation with buyers if no public announcements had been made in advance. The 
oil prices increase took place in the Spring of 1999, but firms only began elevation in 
October. The reasons mentioned by firms are legitimate but fail in and of themselves 
to explain how firms could act similarly in the absence of inter-firm communication.   
 
          4.4. Assessment and Rehabilitation of reporting system 
 It is sufficiently recognized in the relevant literature that facilitating practices 
may have pro-competitive as well as anti-competitive effects. On the one hand, public 
price announcements may be necessary and rational business conduct to inform 
customers on future price movements, while on the other, they may also serve as a 
‘communication, signal or invitation to collude’ to coordinate prices. Therefore, when 
several firms make public announcements causing a parallel pricing situation in a 
market, it alerts enforcement authorities to the possibility of a price-fixing cartel 
among firms. Furthermore, if simultaneous parallel price movements occur without 
advance public announcements, and no legitimate business reason exists, the suspicion 
of collusion is even greater.  
A reporting system can be a useful instrument in collecting the necessary 
information on parallel pricing schemes in the market. Careful analysis of these 
schemes may alert regulators to the possibility of collusion among firms. However, 
when it comes to proof of tacit collusion, the positions of enforcers and courts differ 
greatly. Courts are reluctant to infer collusion based on circumstantial evidence, and 
using evidence of facilitating practices may not convince courts.  
Furthermore, the former Japanese reporting system had certain defects that 
undermined its helpfulness in combating tacit collusion. The main purpose of the 
reporting system had been the prevention of price elevations caused by tacit collusion. 
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Nonetheless, the reporting system had an ex-post character thus making prevention 
impossible while causing cost and administrative burdens for firms and enforcement 
authorities alike. What is more, the economic reasons reported by firms were general, 
with no detailed information to check the legitimacy of the purported reasons for price 
elevation. Additionally, in that period, it is possible that the Japanese enforcement 
authority lacked the economic analytical expertise necessary to identify inaccuracies in 
the reports of firms to expose their collusive actions. However, in this author’s view, 
conditions are different nowadays – modern enforcement authorities including the 
JFTC have gained the necessary analytical skills to detect imperfections in reports. 
Furthermore, a redesigned reporting system can be efficiently workable and 
supplementary to the leniency program, which if combined may amount to the ultimate 
tool for the identification of cartels.  The present author would propose the following 
reconstructed reporting system model: 
Figure 2.  Comparison between old and a redesigned reporting system 
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As is evident from the figure above, the main structural differences between the 
two models are as follows: First, unlike the old reporting system, the amended model 
places an obligation of firms to report planned price elevations to enforcement 
authorities at the midpoint of the repricing process. Second, firms willing to make 
public price announcements should do it only after reporting the new price to  
enforcement authorities. It is necessary to note here that the present author is not in 
favor of banning the practice of public announcements at all because it can be a 
significant device to communicate with customers for certain firms and markets.  
Any price announcements that firms intend to make should be made only after – and 
never before – submitting the report to enforcement authorities and it is helpful to 
prevent signaling schemes.  It should be noted here that making a public 
announcement should remain optional. Third, the report to enforcement authorities 
should be done no later than 30 days before the implementation date. That is, firms 
should implement the price increase no later than 30 days since submitting their 
report to enforcement authorities. It should be noted here that the 30-day term of this 
requirement is advisory/optional that may be lengthened or shortened depending on 
the specific market and/or enforcement conditions in each jurisdiction concerned. 
The price increase reporting system proposed in the foregoing is different 
from the merger and acquisition notification system: enforcement authorities do not 
have a right to veto price elevations, or order a reduction of the price increase rate. 
However, it may be necessary in cases where there is suspicious price behavior for 
enforcement authorities to consider a fuller investigation.  
With regard to the content of the report, it should be specific and detailed in 
order for it to be a reliable and valuable source of information. In particular, the 
reports should provide answers to the following questions: 
- What are the legitimate economic reasons for the price increase? 
- What is the economic basis for the new price rate? 
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- Why has this timing been chosen for the price increase? 
- Is a public price announcement planned, and, if so, why? 
The answer fields on the submission form of the report should be blank. It is 
advisable that the form should include a warning note concerning price-fixing cartel 
behavior, and information on the applicable sanctions in such event. Also, the form 
should mention the opportunity for firms to opt for the leniency program, and its 
benefits for those who are in collusion but who are considering notifying regulators. 
Therefore, it would be advisable to have a special form designed for reporting that 
may be downloadable from the website of enforcement authorities.   
In addition, no change in price rate and/or implementation date should be 
permissible after the report has been submitted to enforcement authorities. If a firm 
would want to make changes, it would have to submit a separate report and wait for 
a month for implementation. The demand for resubmission of the report in case of 
price modification helps to prevent firms from manipulating the reporting system.   
For instance, Firm A has submitted a report on price elevation and made a public 
price announcement, but has not implemented it yet. Being aware of Firm A price 
increase rate, Firm B has also submitted report and make an announcement with a 
higher price than Firm A did.  Firm B is aware that if Firm A will not follow him he 
has to return to the previous price. Otherwise, Firm B may lose its customers to 
Firm A due to higher price. If Firm B wants to make a signal to Firm A to follow his 
higher price, Firm A has to submit a separate report and wait for a month to 
implement a new price. Waiting a month can be a risky for Firm B as his customers 
may go to Firm A, whose price is lower than Firm B. Furthermore, Firm A should 
find an excuse to justify his price change in the new report. Nonetheless, in case 
when Firm A does not follow Firm B’s higher price, for instance, Firm B has to 
resubmit a report to lower and adjust a price with Firm A’s announced price to keep 
customers in. Thus, reporting system has two indirect effect against tacit collusion.  
First, a physiologic effect. Price elevation via reporting system makes firms to feel 
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that regulator is aware of your action and keeps eye on you and any interfirm 
communication can be easily detected. Second, a whistleblowing effect. When any 
of Firm A or B in above example makes price modification by resubmitting a report, 
it gives a warning to enforcement authorities about possible signalling scenario.  
 Regarding the scope of goods and services that should be subject to the price 
elevation reporting mechanism, it would be recommended to limit the scope to those 
oligopolistic markets, where the concern of tacit collusion is high.  Such limitation 
is to avoid too high administrative burden both on firms and enforcing authorities. It 
is much more advisable because the scope of reporting would be much wider than 
the original one of Japan as it also applies to unilateral price increase. Thus, the 
scope of the oligopolistic markets subject to the reporting system can be decided by 
each jurisdiction depending on the potentiality of tacit collusion schemes in these 
markets.  
In general, the present author considers the advantages of the new reporting 
system to be as follows:  
First, it helps to prevent price signaling and price coordination in oligopolistic 
markets. A firm may seek to signal its price elevation intentions by publicly 
announcing its prices. However, if no firm follows it, that firm can merely return to 
its previous price. The new reporting system does not prohibit the practice of public 
announcements but allows them only after the report has been submitted to 
enforcement authorities. After the report has been submitted, no changes in price rate 
or implementation date are permitted. Therefore, a firm cannot simply return to its 
previous price after the report has been made to enforcement authorities. Thus, the 
reporting system significantly limits the opportunity of firms to align their prices.  
Second, the reporting system with less effort provides enforcement authorities 
with the price changing information in the market and its reasons. There are many 
types of markets and many firms thus making it extremely hard, if not impossible, 
for enforcement authorities to follow all market activities in order to ensure that all 
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firms play fairly in the market. Sometimes, due to the lack of information, 
enforcement authorities react late, by which stage anti-competitive action has 
already harmed competition in a market. However, the reporting system proposed in 
the foregoing would allow enforcement authorities to gather essential information 
on time and effectively respond to prevent any violation of competition rules.  
Third, the proposed reporting system reduces investigation costs for 
competition authorities. This is evident in two ways: a) the content of the report may 
shorten the time for collecting necessary data and monitoring the market; and b) if a 
firm submitted fabricated, or unclear information in the report, this fact can be used 
as evidence of collusion against that firm.  
Fourth, the reporting system may stimulate ex-ante preventive actions of 
enforcement authorities by alerting them to possible collusive schemes and thus 
attracting careful investigation on the part of enforcement authorities. When several 
firms submit parallel reports with suspicious economic reasons for price elevation, 
enforcement authorities may initiate the investigation in due course.    
Lastly, in case where a firm subject to the reporting procedure fails to submit 
the report, enforcement authorities would be justified to impose sanctions for this 
breach. If many firms ignore the reporting procedure and implement parallel price 
elevations, the case may reasonably be suspected to amount to tacit collusion.  
 
          4.5. Lessons for CIS countries including Uzbekistan 
Uzbekistan is one of CIS countries under economic transition. During the Soviet era, 
the economy of Uzbekistan was based on a central command system, which left no place 
for markets and competition. State ownership, absolute state monopoly, and state price 
control were the primary tools for the government to regulate the economy.   Following 
independence in 1991, Uzbekistan has chosen to orientate towards a market-based 
economy with a gradual transformation strategy, while only Russia among current CIS 
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countries has chosen a shock therapy to liberalize economy.  Within 25 years of 
implementing transitional regulatory policies, Uzbekistan has achieved a certain level of 
attainment of a market economy. 
In the early years of transition, a government priority had been the regulation of 
monopolies. Successful state policies on demonopolization have led to a significant drop in 
the number of monopolies, which, in turn, has led to the creation of numerous new 
enterprises.261 A monopolistic environment has gradually been replaced by an oligopolistic 
and more competitive market, and, therefore, competition policy is now focusing on 
increasing competition.262 To ensure competition in such circumstances, in 1996 the Uzbek 
government enacted a competition law regime including the establishment of a competition 
authority, namely, the Uzbek Competition Committee (UzCC). The similar policy reforms 
have taken place in all CIS countries.  
Nonetheless, current cartel regulation is not effective in the majority of CIS countries 
including Uzbekistan. Several problems are hindering successful anti-cartel regulation. 
First, a shortage financial and human resources 263 is a common issue facing competition 
enforcement authorities almost in all CIS countries. Particularly, due to the secrecy and 
complexity of detection and proving a cartel conduct, the Uzbek Competition Committee 
needs more resources for investigation and regulation. Second, a lack of investigative 
powers of the UzCC; Article 21 of the Uzbek Competition Law stipulates a list of powers 
given to the UzCC, where, however, the necessary investigative powers are absent, which, 
                                                                 
261Center for Improvement of Anti-monopoly Policy, Competition Policy and Anti-monopoly Regulation 
in Uzbekistan: Analytical report on the development, status, trends and issues of anti-monopoly and 
competition policy in Uzbekistan in 2000-2009. (2009), 29 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Analytical 
Report 2009’). 
262岸井 大太郎 , 大槻 文俊 , 和田 健夫 , 川島 富士雄 、向田 直範 , 稗貫 俊文 『経済法：独占禁止
法と競争政策』第 8版、（有斐閣アルマ、2016年）、259-302  頁。 
263The ‘toothless’ Competition Committee is not attractive for workers, while a private sector offers 
more financial and carrier prosperity. Those who joined the Committee usually do not stay for a long 
time and leave as soon as possible.(From the author’s interview with the Head of the Department of the 
Competition Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan, September 16, 2015) 
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in turn, causes difficulty for the UzCC in obtaining direct evidence against cartels. Third, a 
poor sanctioning regime for cartel conduct; the competition authority may impose only an 
administrative surcharge, the maximum amount of which is approximately 400 USD. Also, 
there is no criminal prosecution for cartel conduct in Uzbekistan. In addition, legal persons 
were excluded from liability. That is, companies evade responsibility for cartel behavior, 
but individuals – such as managers, directors, and other company officers – have been 
made accountable.  Therefore, the existing sanctioning regime has no real preventive effect 
in Uzbekistan.  
       4.5.1. Regulation of tacit collusion in Uzbekistan 
Cartel conduct is prohibited by Article 11 of the Uzbek Competition Law. The law 
also differentiates between two types of cartel conduct: concerted practice and agreements. 
The law defines the terms concerted action and agreement as follows:264 
The Regulation265 lists several types of circumstantial evidence to infer collusion. 
According to the Regulation, a public price announcement without plausible reasoning for 
such conduct may be a powerful sign of collusion.  In other words, if firms fail to provide 
a convincing economic explanation for their public price announcements that could be 
sufficient evidence to infer collusion in Uzbekistan.  Furthermore, simultaneous parallel 
pricing within 30 days can also be considered a strong indicator of possible collusion in a 
market. Nonetheless, it does not mean that competition authorities may condemn firms 
solely based on 30 days’ parallel pricing or identical pricing.  
An evident tacit collusion case is considered to be the Mobile operator,266 where the 
UzCC had condemned two largest mobile phone companies for forming a price-fixing 
                                                                 
264 Regulation on inferring concerted practice and collusive agreements restricting competition issued 
by the Cabinet of Ministers.  (August 20, 2013 #230).  
265 Annex 3 of the Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers from August 20, 2013 # 230. Regulation on 
the procedure for the deterrence of concerted practice and agreements restricting competition par. 
para.12. 
266The Report to the Chairman of the Uzbek Competition Committee (in Russian) (the file is in the 
author’s private possession). 
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cartel in April 2013 solely for the parallel price increases that had occurred within a month 
of each other.   The mobile companies involved rejected allegations of collusion justifying 
their parallel price elevation by the tax increase for each customer’s number. Nonetheless, it 
seems that for the UzCC it was sufficient that parallel pricing had occurred within 30 days 
to make a finding of collusion. The case demonstrates that the UzCC established tacit 
collusion for parallel pricing conduct within 30 days without providing evidence of 
interfirm communication. Such understanding of tacit collusion may cause ‘Type 1’and 
‘Type 2’ errors.267 That is, if interdependent behavior occurs within 30 days, the regulator 
automatically considers the parallel behavior as a violation of competition rules even  if 
there is no evidence of collusion and the interdependence is merely due to predictable 
outcomes in oligopolistic markets, which may cause a 'type 1 error'. As for a ‘type 2 error’, 
firms doing a cartel can avoid liability if they keep a more extended time gap (more than 30 
days) between their parallel conduct.  
 
       4.5.2. Implementation of the reporting system 
Currently, Uzbekistan has a registration system for firms with a dominant 
market position, which also operates almost in all CIS countries. 268  There are two 
criteria to establish the dominance of firms in Uzbekistan: 1) if a firm possesses a 
market share greater than 50 percent, it is automatically recognized as dominant; 2) if a 
firm possesses a market share of 30-50%, where its market share has been stable during 
a year.  According to the registration system, dominant firms included in the register 
have to report on a quarterly basis to the enforcement agency about prices for its 
products and services. The current number of dominant firms included in the register is 
586.269 The purpose of the register system is to prevent monopolies from manipulating 
prices. The enforcement agency can order a firm to change the price in cases it finds 
                                                                 
267 A type I error is to falsely infer the existence of cartel that is not there, while a type II error is to 
falsely infer the absence of collusion of that is actually present.  
268 Russia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Kirgizstan.  
269 https://data.gov.uz/uz/datasets/2117?dp-1-page=30 
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that a dominant firm has manipulated prices. Dominant firms who disagree with such an 
order may take their complaint to a court.  
In the opinion of this author, such a registration system has several defects. 
First, it creates a burden for both firms as well as enforcement authorities. Firms have to 
report four times per year about each price change and enforcement agencies have to 
check each report to establish whether it is a normal or a monopoly price, which, 
undoubtedly, results in high investigating costs. Second, the registration system is less 
apt at combating price- fixing cartels as whether a firm has set a normal or a monopoly 
price is determined by comparison with prices of rival firms. So, if all firms have raised 
prices, it is not clear how it can be established whether the price is fair or is a 
consequence of artificial inflation. Third, there is no requirement for dominant firms to 
provide in their reports a reason for the price increase; an indication of a new price is all 
that is required. Fourth, as dominant firms have to report on a quarterly basis when a 
price change occurs between reporting periods, and if the enforcement authority 
recognizes it to be a monopolistic inflated price, it would be unreasonable to order a 
firm to reduce the price as it has already been implemented. Fifth, the register system 
focuses on the price of dominant firms. However, the pricing of non-dominant firms 
with substantial market share in oligopolistic markets must be also somehow monitored.  
Taking into account the defects of the current registration system of Uzbekistan 
discussed in the foregoing, this author suggests that the system be amended so that it 
become more efficient along the lines discussed earlier in connection to the proposed 
reporting system (See paragraph 4.4. above).  
 
       4.5.3. Policy recommendations 
Based on the experience of the three advanced regulatory areas and the 
theoretical analysis presented in the present work, general and specific 
recommendations for CIS countries including Uzbekistan to deal with oligopoly 
problem effectively are included in this thesis. 
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The general recommendations are as follows.  
First, it is necessary to endow enforcement authorities with the necessary 
investigative powers.  Investigative powers are an essential tool to identify explicit as 
well as tacit collusion in a market. 
Second, the level of the administrative surcharge should be severe, and not only 
individual but also corporate liability should be possible. However, when the inference 
of tacit collusion is based on circumstantial evidence, the administrative fine should be 
much lower than in cases where there is direct evidence.  
 Third, this author does not recommend Uzbekistan to criminalize cartel conduct, 
given that this may in turn require courts to set higher evidentiary standards as per the 
US experience. Of course, criminalization of cartel conduct could lead to greater take-
up of the leniency program, but it may also lead to fewer prosecutions and thus the 
normalization of tacit collusion within competition law. 
Fourth, the strict demand for evidence of inter- firm communication to prove 
collusive conduct, as is the case in advanced jurisdictions, may cause difficulties in 
detecting concealed cartels in oligopolistic markets in CIS countries, which have 
shortage of resources and expertise.  The overview of the experience of the US, the EU 
and Japan has showed that advanced jurisdictions face substantial challenges in 
identification of tacit collusion. If advanced countries struggle to combat price-fixing 
collusions even having sufficient resources, there is no way for CIS countries then. 
Therefore, the dissertation concludes that until CIS countries gain some experience 
and enhance enforcement institutions in terms of human and financial resources, it is 
advisable to apply rebuttable presumption 270  approach in dealing with cartels. It 
                                                                 
270A rebuttable presumption is an assumption that is taken to be true unless someone comes 
forward to contest it and prove otherwise.  
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implies that in case when parallel action occurs in oligopolistic markets, the burden of 
proof rests on the firms’ shoulders.  For example, the firms which have simultaneously 
raised prices are presumed price-fixers unless sufficient proof of non-cartel conduct is 
provided by firms. Furthermore, it is proposed that tacit collusion be defined as 
described in Chapter 3.   
 
        4.6. Concluding remarks 
This dissertation draws the following conclusions concerning the issue of tacit 
collusion: 
First, the definition of cartel should include not only explicit but also implicit (i.e., 
tacit) collusion. This dissertation demonstrates the competition laws of three advanced 
jurisdictions had originally been intentionally designed to include tacit collusion, which 
is covered by the notions of combination, conspiracy, or concerted practice. Nonetheless, 
the absence of a precise definition of tacit collusion and its, at times, confusing and 
contradictory interpretation by courts has resulted in the exclusion of tacit collusion from 
the definition of cartel conduct.   
Second, tacit collusion doctrine should be applicable only in o ligopolistic markets. 
In markets with many firms, cartel cases should be considered based on the doctrine of 
the explicit cartel, which implies a strong requirement for the evidence of explicit and 
direct communication. This is because price coordination in markets with many firms is 
difficult to occur without direct interfirm communication due to high market uncertainty.  
Third, the notions of tacit collusion and conscious parallelism should not be equal 
in legal meaning and effect. Conscious parallelism is the behavioral outcome when firms 
take no steps to communicate by indirect means. Meanwhile, tacit collusion is when 
firms achieve price coordination by indirect or implicit communication.  
Fourth, no direct communication/agreement should be required to prove tacit 
collusion. However, the mere presence of some facilitating practice should not be 
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sufficient evidence to establish interfirm communication. It is necessary to prove that 
any facilitating practice present is used for purposes of signaling or invitation to collude, 
which can be established through carefully examining the content and method of the 
facilitating practice/s present in a case.  
Fifth, the implementation of a reporting system can serve as an effective tool to 
prevent and identify tacit collusion in the oligopolistic market along with the leniency 
program. The modified reporting system (proposed previously in this thesis) is suited to 
making price signaling efforts difficult to occur given that any public price 
announcements intended on the part of firms are only permissible after the report has 
been submitted by them to enforcement authorities. Furthermore, the proposed reporting 
system informs enforcement authorities of potential price elevations in essential sectors 
of oligopolistic markets, which reduces the scope for firms to secretly achieve price 
coordination.  
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